Dr. Nisan Alıcı, a faculty member at the University of Derby and a volunteer with the DEMOS Research Collective (Democracy, Peace, and Alternative Politics Research Association) working on transitional justice in post-conflict contexts, responded to ANF's questions.

She noted that many mechanisms such as truth commissions have been debated through civil society initiatives in Turkey, particularly since the early 2000s. According to Dr. Alıcı, these efforts could be revived in the new period, and what is needed is not a formal agreement but genuine political will.

What exactly does the concept of transitional justice refer to?

Transitional justice refers to the set of mechanisms used by societies transitioning from conflict to peace, or from authoritarian and dictatorial regimes to democratic systems, to reckon with the past and hold perpetrators accountable for crimes committed during periods of violence. It encompasses both legal processes, such as criminal trials, and more conciliatory mechanisms like truth commissions. These may also include elements of forgiveness and aim to support healing and restoration. It is a broad and comprehensive framework that seeks not only justice but also social reconciliation. Each country adapts these mechanisms to its own specific context of conflict, sometimes implementing the full range, and at other times choosing only certain tools depending on its needs and conditions.

Does transitional justice require a signed peace agreement, especially in a context like Turkey where no such agreement exists and only the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has taken steps so far?

This is exactly the question at the center of my doctoral dissertation and also the focus of my forthcoming book. Until now, transitional justice has most often been implemented after the signing of a peace agreement. A recent example is Colombia, where mechanisms for transitional justice were intricately designed as part of the peace deal. But we are increasingly seeing that even in the absence of a formal agreement and sometimes even while conflict continues, partial steps toward peace can still be taken. In such contexts, certain elements of transitional justice have been used. These have mostly been legal proceedings, but there are also other mechanisms initiated by civil society actors.

What are these different mechanisms?

In the context of Turkey, even the Compensation Law that came into effect in 2004 can be seen, albeit as a failed and limited attempt, as an early example of such mechanisms. There is also the Civil Society Commission for Investigating the Truth of Diyarbakır Prison, a civil initiative launched in particular by the 78’ers Initiative. Starting in 2007 and continuing for about four to five years, it functioned almost as a fully developed truth commission, collecting testimonies from 500 former prisoners and detainees. This was carried out despite the complete absence of a legal framework or a peace process.

Today, the conditions for such efforts are much more favorable. To return to the original question: yes, I absolutely believe that mechanisms of transitional justice can be implemented even without a peace agreement. Take the issue of enforced disappearances, for example. Many individuals accused of perpetrating enforced disappearances have either been acquitted or have never been held accountable, and impunity continues. In recent weeks, we have seen renewed public calls for justice on this issue. Perpetrators of enforced disappearances can be prosecuted, closed cases can be reopened, and previously dismissed files can be reviewed. None of this requires a peace agreement. A judicial process could be launched, and that alone would represent a meaningful response to a long-standing demand for justice. It would be a significant step that provides hope and a measure of relief to the families of victims and those affected by the conflict, signaling that these crimes will not be repeated.

Another example: a truth commission could be established. If survivors, victims, or the families of the disappeared are demanding such a body, it could be created through parliament or through another mechanism. We do not necessarily need a peace agreement for this, but we do need political will. Civil society must also raise its voice more strongly to express the need for transitional justice and help guide the way forward. This is something we have been discussing for a long time at the DEMOS. As civil society actors, we have been asking ourselves how we can engage with this process. Perhaps these could be the ways to begin.

There has already been a long-standing struggle for justice in Turkey, and many civil society organizations and institutions have been leading this effort. These are groups that have worked closely with families of the disappeared, survivors of torture, and people who have been forcibly displaced. Based on this experience, civil society could help clarify what justice means in this context, which mechanisms are most appropriate and applicable, and offer a roadmap. If a truth commission is to be established, civil society could contribute recommendations on which topics it should focus on, which time periods it should investigate, who should serve on the commission, and how it should function.

Turkey experienced a similar process most recently between 2013 and 2015. The conditions of that period were, of course, different. Many dynamics have shifted on the international stage. But once again, we are talking about a peace process. Justice-related efforts were also attempted at that time. Should that period be compared with today, and if so, what are the key differences?

The truth commission example I mentioned was from 2007, well before the peace process. So if we don’t limit ourselves to just 2013–2015, we can see that the roots of transitional justice efforts go back five to ten years earlier. It was a time when confronting the past and reckoning with historical injustices were more openly discussed. Issues like the Armenian Genocide and the Kurdish question were being talked about more widely. Civil society was more active in this area, and there was more space, both politically and socially, for memory work and collective remembrance. These concepts were more widely used and accepted. During the formal peace process, the public’s awareness of the Kurdish issue and the presence of an official dialogue intensified the demand for justice.

What made that time unique was that transitional justice and reckoning with the past were being discussed alongside the peace process itself. I recall discussions from that period, particularly in civil society meetings, about what a truth commission should address. Should it focus only on the Kurdish question? Should it also include the Armenians and broader reconciliation? These were more detailed and inclusive conversations, and more institutions publicly embraced such demands. Since then, however, an increasingly authoritarian regime has placed immense pressure on both civil society and political life. As a result, these calls for truth and justice have been pushed into silence.

Until recently, we were still trying to figure out whether there was even a peace process underway. In that climate of distrust, demands for justice, truth, and transitional justice were not clearly voiced, this is something I observed within civil society itself. But now, with talk of a parliamentary commission forming and the process becoming more tangible, I’ve noticed these demands gaining momentum again. I’ve been in Diyarbakır (Amed) for a few weeks, and I’ve seen these conversations becoming more prominent. In the coming weeks and months, we are likely to hear more insistently that demands for justice and truth must be inseparable from the peace process.

This will be a process that unfolds over many years. If the peace process continues and physical conflict comes to a lasting end, we will have the time and space to address these matters. And of course, there will be much to do. So many lives have been lost. The trauma, the return of remains, the issue of graves, and how collective mourning is carried out, all of these questions will accompany the demand for justice. These are all part of the field of transitional justice.

Are you currently conducting fieldwork on this topic in Diyarbakır, and could you share your observations?

The research I’m conducting at the moment is not directly related to this topic. It’s more focused on ecology and environmental destruction. I’m working on it together with a fellow researcher. So the study itself is not directly about transitional justice, but coincidentally, the timing of our fieldwork has overlapped with the recent intensification of peace process discussions. Naturally, the topic comes up, even if it isn’t our primary focus. What we’ve encountered here is something else that’s deeply important: ecological destruction is also one of the major consequences of the conflict. And it’s not something that will end once the conflict ends. This issue needs to be taken seriously in its own right. The destruction in Şırnak (Şirnex), and now also in Diyarbakır and surrounding areas, has become particularly severe in recent times.

Looking at global examples, one common risk is also something that people here are beginning to express concern about: what does the start of a peace process mean in practice? It means that armed conflict will no longer be present in these regions. And this, in turn, makes these areas more accessible and attractive to international capital, turning them into more “investable” spaces. That carries the risk of further opening these lands to exploitation and intensifying environmental destruction. For that reason, this issue must be addressed as part of the process moving forward, it needs to be acknowledged, analyzed, and actively resisted.