Gazi Mahallesi (Gazi Neighborhood) remains one of Istanbul’s poorest neighborhoods. Created in the 1990s by Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi migrants who were forced to move to Istanbul, the neighborhood has continued to attract special attention from the state. With poverty at its core, and an organized rebellion born from that poverty, the state’s interest in the neighborhood has never waned. 

During the 1990s, as Turkey's economic crisis deepened and the Turkish state intensified its genocidal attacks on the Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Kurdish people, a neighborhood began to form on the outskirts of Istanbul, driven by both economic necessity and the state’s oppression. Situated within Gaziosmanpaşa, one of Istanbul’s largest districts, Gazi has been subjected to state pressure since the day it was established. 

An example of the state's hatred toward the poor 

The neighborhood's impoverished nature also brought with it a revolutionary spirit. From the moment of its founding, Gazi became a base for revolutionaries, socialists, and supporters of the Kurdish Freedom Movement. The high concentration of Kurds and Turkish Alevis played a crucial role in shaping the identity of the neighborhood. As a place where people faced both economic and ethnic oppression, Gazi became a hub for those resisting both class-based and identity-based discrimination. Particularly after the 12 September 1980 military coup, when revolutionary opposition was heavily suppressed across Turkey, the neighborhood became one of the places where resistance re-emerged. 

The state’s first major intervention in Gazi came when Kurdish migrants who had been forced to flee Kurdistan in the 1990s started settling in the neighborhood and building informal homes. The Kurdish residents, seeking safety, established community associations—immediately drawing the attention of the police. Homes of displaced Kurds were frequently raided, and as revolutionary organizations and the Kurdish Freedom Movement grew in influence, police harassment and pressure escalated. 

When attacks failed, a massacre followed 

At the same time, the state implemented special warfare tactics that it had previously used in Kurdistan. It first tried to introduce crime and drug dealers into the neighborhood, but when both the people and revolutionaries resisted, this approach was temporarily abandoned. However, the state then orchestrated one of the largest massacres in Turkish history. On 12 March 1995, gunmen opened fire on establishments frequented by Kurds and Alevis in Gazi. The perpetrators were never identified or prosecuted. In the brutal police and military crackdown on the protests that followed, the state did everything in its power to protect its own agents. 

On 12 March 1995, and in the following days, 15 people were killed by state forces in Gazi. The state sought to shield the real perpetrators by selecting a few scapegoats and handing them minor sentences, attempting to cover up the massacre. The Gazi Massacre became a turning point for the neighborhood. Until that day, most residents had simply been trying to survive. However, after the massacre, their connection with revolutionaries deepened, and the neighborhood entered a period where revolutionaries, rather than state institutions, played a key role in addressing local issues. Although the state tried to reassert control through brute force, the people’s support for the revolutionaries demonstrated that the state had little real power in the neighborhood. 

Intensifying special warfare tactics  

Having realized that establishing control through force was nearly impossible, the state began implementing an extensive special warfare strategy in Gazi. Alongside raids, torture, and executions targeting revolutionaries and the Kurdish Freedom Movement, the state also sought to sever the neighborhood’s ties with revolutionary groups. One of the main aspects of this policy was focusing on the younger generation, particularly those aged 12 to 20, rather than the older generation that had originally built the neighborhood. 

During the 1990s, revolutionaries were a dominant force in Gazi. However, by the 2000s, the state began altering the neighborhood’s demographic composition. It relocated people with Islamist political affiliations into specific areas of the neighborhood to create a counterbalance to revolutionary influences. Initially subtle, these changes became more apparent by the 2010s, when religious sects started gaining ground and even opening illegal schools. 

Demographic manipulation intensifies 

The demographic transformation of Gazi accelerated during the years of AKP rule. The rise of political Islam strengthened the state’s influence in certain areas. However, because the revolutionary movement and the Kurdish Freedom Movement remained strong, these changes initially did not seem very significant. By the 2010s, however, tensions between these opposing forces became more visible. While state-backed efforts to spread corruption and criminality in the neighborhood faced pushback from revolutionaries and the community, the state did not abandon its long-term plan. 

Between 2010 and 2015, a clearer struggle emerged between two opposing forces in the neighborhood. The rise of the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDGH), which represented organized Kurdish youth, along with other revolutionary groups, countered the state’s efforts to introduce social decay. However, 2015 marked a significant turning point. 

With the Turkish state's military operations in Rojava and the start of the Self-Rule Resistance, many young people from major cities like Istanbul left to join the struggle. This temporarily slowed the growing revolutionary resistance in Gazi. The departure of two generations of fighters created a void, and the power struggle within the Turkish state—exemplified by the 15 July 2016 coup attempt—provided the state with a new pretext for direct intervention. 

Targeting revolutionaries through propaganda  

Even before 2015, the state had been trying to discredit revolutionaries through propaganda, a key tactic in special warfare operations. Up until 2015, the Turkish state frequently used these methods against Gazi. It even blocked basic public services from reaching the neighborhood and blamed revolutionaries for this deprivation. 

The state pursued this strategy through both media campaigns and people it placed in the neighborhood. Buses were prevented from entering Gazi during peak hours. The municipality deliberately neglected infrastructure projects. Authorities refused to address crime-related issues, including even minor thefts. Instead, they portrayed the neighborhood as "the most dangerous area" on social media, blaming revolutionaries for every issue affecting daily life. 

Meanwhile, the state constructed a shopping mall at the entrance of the neighborhood and built luxury housing complexes under the name "European Residences." The government then promoted the idea that without revolutionaries, similar developments would be possible across the neighborhood. Even the metro system, which was originally planned to pass through the neighborhood, was rerouted as part of this psychological warfare campaign. The state justified this decision by falsely blaming the revolutionary movement.