Ertuğrul Kürkçü, HDP Honorary President, PACE Honorary Member, and IE Advisory Board Member, assessed current internal and external developments for ANF.

Erdogan's diplomat crisis, his following statements, the weakening of the Turkish lira following the CBT ruling... The most prevalent comment circulating is that "Erdogan has no idea of what he is doing." In a previous interview, you indicated that Erdogan's movements were "unpredictable." So, in light of recent events, what is your assessment?

It is apparent that Tayyip Erdogan went beyond his purpose in the ambassador crisis, or at the very least damaged the government's politics. This cannot be considered to have been done within the framework of logic. This situation could have been dealt with taking into account the diplomatic loans made available by the United States; otherwise, it could have had much more complicated implications.

Tayyip Erdogan's impulsive outbursts could be compensated for more easily when his manoeuvring space is large enough. Tayyip Erdogan did not always act reasonably in politics, but his outbursts occasionally worked. But the zigzags that dominate this general policy are more about navigating between conflicting tendencies than not knowing what to do.

What are these conflicting tendencies?

For example, while following policies that take care of small and medium-sized capital production for the domestic market, they try to protect the interests of finance-capital groups that appeal to the international export market and work closely with financial markets at the same time. However, this is not always possible; you must select between the two options.

Erdogan engages in the contradicting actions you mention in foreign politics as well. A new Syrian operation is back on the table, and the bill to extend foreign military missions has been approved by parliament. Several countries have shifted their position in the last ten years. Do you believe Erdogan is attempting to bring about a new era in Syria? What are your thoughts?

Many of Tayyip Erdogan's seemingly irrational moves actually provide him with information about a specific area of activity where he can gain relatively quickly. More specifically, Tayyip Erdogan is attempting to do things that no previous Turkish administration has done, and most of them are not based on a plan, but he has been able to open up new regions for himself by exploiting some of the gaps he has discovered. This contributes to Tayyip Erdogan's "unpredictability." Libya appears to be one of the most prominent examples. When the West launched an attack on Gaddafi, Tayyip Erdogan's initial thought was, ‘What are we doing in Libya?’ He was a partner in Gaddafi's overthrow four days after saying this, and for a while, he was the new Libyan regime's closest ally. Later, he began to seek a power centre in Tripoli that would alter the balance of the Mediterranean, and he became a participant in the Libyan Civil War: The Blue Homeland concept was built on top of this conflict. These are partly related to Erdogan's approach to events, taking the lead and generally disrespecting international law. The driving factor behind this, however, is the Turkish capital's drive to gain deeper markets and capital export grounds beyond its own backyard. Erdogan seizes opportunities wherever he sees them. This, too, comes at a high price. New enemies necessitate new expenditures. This is how Erdogan's ‘crony capitalism’ works.

Let's expand on this… How exactly?

The assessment that Turkish capitalism's most valued export item is its ‘army’ is proven once more. Military outposts in Qatar and Somalia, military cooperation with Sudan, peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, security support in Kosovo and Albania, war participation in Azerbaijan, drones supplies to Ukraine, and military security around the palace, according to Erdogan's statement. Here, an industrial focus is established. Once the countries are firmly established, a 'give-and-take' relationship within cooperative governments begins. When viewed in this light, it finds itself in the midst of conflict, sometimes for legitimate causes, such as the power struggle in this market, and sometimes due to unforeseen and unplanned behaviours.

Concerning the situation in Syria, particularly the attitude to the Kurdish victories, we can speak of an approach that is not exclusively dependent on Erdogan's whim, but is based on a broader consensus, which the Turkish Arm Forces has steadily imposed on Erdogan. Tayyip Erdogan's Syria policy remains based on an assimilationist state strategy in which Kurds are viewed as an existential threat. That is why the Turkish Armed Forces are unlikely to raise a serious disagreement with Tayyip Erdogan's Syria policies. The perception of the Kurdish presence in Syria, Rojava, south of the Turkey-Syria border as a threat, the need to wipe out Kurds from the border, the construction of impenetrable borders is a policy shared by all sovereign partners.

Tayyip Erdogan also stands out ideologically: He builds specific links and alliances with ISIS, al-Nusra, and other jihadist organizations, with political Islam at the heart. This is where it deviates from the status quo. The most pressing issue here is that, for the first time in Turkish politics, overseas military operations have become the primary way of obtaining permission in the name of the government during Tayyip Erdogan's tenure. Governments and chiefs of staff traditionally avoided such expeditions since past governments, particularly those of the Cold War era, lacked military power and lacked a conjuncture that allowed for such a broad range of geographic mobility.

Such moves are taken under the pressure of conjuncture during the Tayyip Erdogan era. The fact that his allies, particularly in Idlib, who were agitated for regime change in Syria by Erdogan himself and armed under US-coordinated train-equip programs, will face a life-or-death conflict with Damascus and Moscow, drives Tayyip Erdogan to embark on an adventure. The CHP's opposition to the action can be interpreted as a disagreement to the hazards posed by the transition of this operation into an invasion operation aimed at Til Rıfat. Erdogan's plans to respond to Syria and Russia's evacuation of Al Nusra from Idlib by establishing a safe haven with the seizure of Tel Rifat are well known. There were complaints that this approach lacked a military mind. The thought of Erdogan attempting to use the loss of life, which has no military justification, as an election investment has clearly shattered the current quo.

Erdogan's calculations do not fit the situation, and he behaves utterly impulsively and in his own self-interest. It is always more reasonable in the state tradition to represent common interests. Tayyip Erdogan, on the other hand, kept the demands of the military-industrial complex, in which he was a central figure, so close to his heart that he could not share them with other parties and carved them out for himself. Given the remote possibility of this attack taking place in collaboration with the United States and Russia, we may conclude that the expedition to Syria this time is a suicide attempt.

You mentioned Erdogan's efforts to achieve consensus in such operations. While the CHP had previously supported the agreement, it now opposes it, the first time in seven years. Is this stance taken by the CHP strong enough to shift the balance of power in domestic politics, or is it the result of those 'contradictions' you described?

Both the CHP and the IYI Party, in my opinion, took a sensible step toward their respective goals of gaining power. The CHP took the risk of becoming Tayyip Erdogan's target. They have calculated the possible profit and loss of this expenditure. Except for the top of the leadership, no one in the home market was convinced about the idea of military intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the rhetoric of the falling regime became increasingly apparent. The government is now attempting to appease the police by telling them, "’ worry, they can't do anything to us.’ Such a scenario would have been inconceivable a year ago. In this sense,  the opposition took the upper hand in terms of both general political and strategical superiority. Apart from that, because the prospect of a new wave of immigration made the entire society anxious, Tayyip Erdogan found himself in the most disadvantaged position at a time when he needed the advantage the most. As a result, all of his moves were met with a brick wall of objective conditions. It's a mess all around.