Three days and everything change. With an incredible - although not surprising - U turn the Turkish media went from praising WikiLeaks to almost ignore it. What caused this sudden change of opinion? Easy to say: for days the Turkish media kept writing about Wikileaks revelations that would expose a link between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and the United States of America. Turkey has been saying and complaining for a while now, although without shouting it, about the 'weak' approach of the US towards the Kurdish Liberation Movement. Without going as far as saying that the US are not doing enough to counter the PKK, the Turkish government has constantly voiced its uneasiness with what it calls 'soft' approach by the US.
WikiLeaks could have provided the good opportunity for Turkey to frame, so to speak America. And so here came the rumors and leaks on the Turkish media. Except that when the leaks were actually published somehow they were not exactly those the Turkish media had been dreamed of.
Indeed there are quite a lot of cables (mostly classified as secret) on Turkey. And they are mostly on the Turkey-Iran relations and the military coup plans and plots.
The cables also contain critical statements about Prime Minister Erdoðan and some of his policies and reveal disagreements between the two allies on some issues, mainly Iran's nuclear program.
The documents, especially the cables dated 2004-2006, reveal critical views held by US diplomats of Erdoðan and his advisers, who they say have “little understanding of politics beyond Ankara.” Erdoðan has surrounded himself with an “iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors,” says one document.
There is another document which is the records of a 40-minute meeting between Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoðlu and Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon. Gordon tried to persuade Davutoðlu that Turkey’s efforts to mediate a deal between the West and Iran may not be entirely helpful or wise, but that Davutoðlu insisted on Turkey’s position.
“Noting that Davutoðlu had only addressed the negative consequences of sanctions or the use of military force, Gordon pressed Davutoðlu on Ankara’s assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoðlu gave a spirited reply, that “of course Turkey was aware of this risk,” the document, dated Nov. 17, 2009, reads. “Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can be helpful as a mediator, some of the prime minister’s recent public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this issue,” the document goes on. But Davutoðlu says some of Erdoðan’s comments on his ties with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were taken out of context and says: “Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians … only because Ankara is showing public messages of friendship.”
In another document, dated Feb. 27, 2009, the US Embassy mentions reports that Turkey and Iran had established a joint venture company to develop gas in Iran and build a pipeline to bring this gas to Turkey and Europe. A Turkish private company, owned by a person said to be a high school friend of Erdoðan, was involved in the deal.
Contrary to what leaked by the Turkish media, the US Embassy cables confirm that Turkish-US cooperation against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), initiated in 2007, is still under way. One document says success of the Turkish military’s campaign against the PKK, supported by US intelligence sharing, “has given the civilians the political space to explore this ‘opening’.”
“Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and President Obama’s declaration before the Turkish Parliament of our continuing commitment to support Turkey’s fight against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This cooperation has helped to improve our bilateral relationship across the board. Turkey’s military leaders value this intelligence and the advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a safe haven,” says the document.
Israeli ambassador on ties with Turkey
The US documents say the Turkish Foreign Ministry and General Staff agree with the US administration that Turkish-Israeli ties are essential for regional stability, while Prime Minister Erdoðan “has sought to shore up his domestic right political flank at the expense of this relationship.” In a document dated Oct. 27, 2009, Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Gaby Levy also seems to agree with the Americans that the deterioration in ties with Turkey is solely attributable to Erdoðan. Levy told US diplomats that “Davutoðlu had relayed a message to him through the visiting Czech foreign minister that ‘things will get better.’
One document, dated Dec. 30, 2004, says Foreign Minister Davutoðlu, widely seen as the architect of Turkey’s foreign policy, was referred to as “exceptionally dangerous” by one of Turkish ministers, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül. “With regard to Islamist influences on Erdoðan, Defense Minister Gönül, who is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Davutoðlu to us as ‘exceptionally dangerous,’” says the document.
It comes to no surprise that the comments by government ministers and the Prime Minister himself have been advocating for caution over WikiLeaks revelations. While heading for Lybia, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan cast doubt on the credibility of the Internet site WikiLeaks and said his government would wait for the completion of the release of US documents before commenting on what the leaked documents have to say on Turkey and Turkish-US ties. “Let WikiLeaks spill the beans first, and then we will find out whether this is serious or not because the seriousness of WikiLeaks is doubtful,” Erdoðan told reporters.