Abdullah Öcalan’s historic declaration on 27 February marked a turning point in discussions on the democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. By challenging the state’s long-standing claim that 'there is no Kurdish issue, only a terrorism problem,' he forcefully revealed the historical reality and legitimacy of the issue.

Professor Hamit Bozarslan, a Middle East expert and faculty member at the Paris School of Social Sciences, spoke to ANF about the historical roots of the Kurdish issue and Abdullah Öcalan’s call.

This is the first part of the interview.

Today, discussions on the democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue are once again taking place. On February 27, Mr. Öcalan framed his call within a historical context. Before addressing this historic call, what is the Kurdish issue that we are discussing today, and what kind of historical trajectory does it have?

The Kurdish issue is, above all, a matter of denial. Kurdistan has been a geographical entity for more than a thousand years. Both Arab and Persian sources mention Kurdistan.

Throughout history, events such as the formation of Kurdish emirates, the shaping of Kurdistan between Ottoman and Persian rule, and the destruction of Kurdish emirates in the 19th century are well known. However, the emergence of the Kurdish issue as a problem began with the establishment of new nation-states and their adoption of a radical nationalist approach. These states refused to recognize the existence of the Kurds as a distinct people and forcibly imposed a national identity, thereby denying the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue, first and foremost, is about rejecting this denial.

Secondly, the Kurdish issue is the struggle of the Kurdish people to reject the status imposed upon them and to become active agents in shaping their own history and lives. Without accepting this, the resolution of the Kurdish issue is impossible. Moreover, the Kurdish issue is not merely a phenomenon associated with violence; it is a process that began long before violence became a factor.

The Kurdish issue did not arise due to imperialist interventions. On the contrary, the resolution of the Kurdish issue must come from within Kurdish society itself. For this, the process of Kurds becoming historical subjects must be recognized and legitimized. There are two fundamental bases of legitimacy here.

The first is the recognition of the Kurdish issue as a national issue in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The second is the acknowledgment that Kurdistan is a region that extends beyond the borders of existing states and that the Kurdish issue should be addressed as a Middle Eastern reality. Without understanding and accepting these two fundamental points, a permanent solution to the Kurdish issue cannot be found.

How did the Kurdish issue take shape in the early years of the Republic? How have the policies of 'one nation, one language' and the state's response to uprisings affected the present day?

Before these uprisings even began, the denial of the Kurdish issue was already a reality. Take the case of Sheikh Said, for example. Before the Sheikh Said uprising, there was the 1924 Constitution, which did not acknowledge the existence of Kurds. The Kemalist movement had made promises to the Kurds. In 1919 and 1920, the Kemalist movement needed the Kurds, but from 1921 on, we see a complete shift. However, the Kurdish issue was still not being explicitly mentioned. When we look at what happened in Dersim and Koçgiri, we see that major massacres took place.

The uprisings were a consequence of existing policies and massacres. In other words, they were a direct result of this policy of denial. They began when Kemalism betrayed its promises to the Kurds. They also started when Kemalism accepted the partitioning of Kurdistan. It is essential to read the state's secret reports from 1925. Kurds were perceived in two ways: either as a biological threat to Turkishness or as raw material that could strengthen Turkish demographics. But for this 'raw material' to be utilized, Kurds had to abandon their Kurdish identity and integrate into Turkishness. That is why I believe the issue is not solely connected to the uprisings.

We are specifically discussing Turkey here. I believe the Kurdish issue in Turkey is extremely important. It has shaped Turkey’s past, blocked its future, and still has the potential to hinder Turkey's progress. Alternatively, if resolved, it could open the way for Turkey. However, radical nationalism is also present in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Kurdish movement is fragmented because it belongs to a divided society. Yet, since the 1920s, there has been an overarching vision that unites all of Kurdistan. In response to the division, Kurds have symbolically united.

One of the responses to this division has been the writing of Kurdish history. Historians may not fully accept this Kurdish historiography because it is partly based on legends and myths. However, it remains a deeply rooted part of Kurdish collective memory. It includes a sense of mapping, a national flag, and a shared identity. All of these elements unify the Kurds. We are witnessing a unification that transcends borders. That is why I believe we must discuss the Kurdish issue in Turkey. But as we engage in this discussion, we must also recognize that the Kurdish issue in Turkey is a part of, and a significant component of, the broader Kurdish issue in the Middle East.

What have been the key breaking points in recent history regarding the Kurdish issue? Which periods stand out?

The most significant breaking point has been the persistent denial of not only the Kurdish issue in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire but also the broader Kurdish issue in the Middle East, from the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) to the present day. We have seen this in Iraq as well. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey adopted a harsh stance against the Barzani movement. Although some changes occurred under Özal, when we look at the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey continued to perceive Iraqi Kurdistan as almost an enemy and carried out numerous interventions against it.

It is important to recall the developments that took place after 2003. The discourse of 'The Kurds are our enemies,' 'Kirkuk is Turkish and will remain Turkish,' and 'The Mosul province is Turkmen and will remain Turkmen' persisted until 2007-2008. Over the past decade, Turkey’s hostile approach toward Rojava has become particularly evident.

Turkey does not accept Rojava gaining any form of legitimate status and has pursued a strict policy against it. The breaking points are not limited to within Turkey; they also stem from Turkey’s broader Middle East strategies.

Although Turkey pursues a broad foreign policy, its central axis has often been the Kurdish issue. For instance, the crisis with Russia in the 2000s and the subsequent rapprochement were directly linked to the Kurdish issue. The near-total destruction of Afrin and the interventions that reached the level of ethnic cleansing were consequences of the Turkey-Russia agreements.

Similarly, one of the key factors in Turkey’s crisis with the United States has been the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue is not just a matter affecting Turkey’s internal dynamics; it is also a significant source of crisis in Middle Eastern and global politics, one that Turkey struggles to manage.

Under what historical and sociological conditions did the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) emerge, to which Mr. Öcalan has now made a call for change and transformation. Did the issue of denial that you mentioned shape the PKK’s emergence?

The emergence of the PKK was shaped by both historical and sociological factors. First and foremost, historical factors played a major role. To understand the formation of the PKK, one must examine the historical ground from which it emerged. This foundation was shaped by social mobilization and the Kurdish awakening of the 1960s. Immediately after, the 1971 military coup took place, which was of great significance for the Kurds. Up until 1971, the Kurdish movement believed that the Kurdish issue could be resolved within a constitutional framework.

However, the 1971 coup made it clear that this was not possible. Another crucial development was the defeat of the Barzani movement in 1975. The collapse of Barzani’s guerrilla insurgency, which had lasted for fifteen years and was highly successful, led to significant radicalization among the Kurds. It was within these historical conditions that the PKK took shape. At the same time, there was also a sociological dimension. The 1970s were a period of severe economic crisis in Kurdistan, during which a new generation emerged while the old intelligentsia weakened. This new generation carried strong plebeian dynamics, which positioned them as elements capable of radicalization.

The PKK was not the only actor of that period. Alongside the Kurdistan National Liberators (KUK), another organization that embraced armed struggle, it became one of the most significant actors resorting to violence. Subsequently, the 1980 military coup (September 12 Coup) took place, dealing severe blows to Kurdish identity. During this period, the PKK reorganized itself outside of Turkish Kurdistan, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, and later initiated an insurrection and guerrilla war in 1984. At the time, very few observers believed that this guerrilla movement, which began in 1984, could succeed.

However, the Kurdish youth, who had been forced into an underground socialization process during the 12 September period, viewed this insurrection and guerrilla movement positively and joined rapidly. From this point on, a new process began with the participation of young people in the PKK’s movement, symbols, and actions. Over time, this process expanded, leading to the formation of the Kurdish political movement and the establishment of Kurdish identity as a hegemonic issue within Kurdish society. It also influenced developments within the Kurdish diaspora.

As I said, the 1970s and 1980s were critical years for both the Kurdish issue and the emergence of the PKK from a historical and sociological perspective.

We are talking about an armed struggle that has been ongoing for half a century. To put it concretely, what gains have the Kurdish people achieved through the PKK’s fifty-year struggle?

We are speaking of a half-century-long process. However, the 1960s were already highly dynamic years for both Turkey and Kurdistan. The PKK emerged within this historical framework, both continuing and breaking away from that legacy. There is a dialectical relationship here; continuity and bifurcation.

Bifurcation refers to a process that radicalizes to its ultimate limits while simultaneously necessitating an inevitable break. For the PKK, this rupture was essential because the radicalization of the process made it unavoidable. However, the consequences of this rupture extended beyond the PKK itself, leading to much broader transformations.

One of the most significant outcomes has been the emergence of a new political class within Kurdish society. There were already Kurdish groups engaged in politics before. For example, in 1977, a Kurdish candidate was elected as mayor in Diyarbakır (Amed). There were also Kurdish movements within various political parties. However, the formation of a political movement that explicitly identified with Kurdish identity and became a hegemonic actor across a vast region of Kurdistan only became possible from the late 1980s on.

The PKK was at the center of these developments. One of the most crucial transformations has been the institutionalization of Kurdish politics. Today, we are talking about a political movement that cannot be thought of independently of the PKK, yet it cannot be entirely reduced to the PKK either. For instance, the political movement shaped by the HEP-DEP tradition, which now appeals to millions of voters, emerged within the broader framework set by the PKK, but it is not solely defined by it.

Over the past 40 years, Kurdish society has undergone a significant intellectual transformation. The Kurdish intellectual class, which was weak in the 1980s, has now become much stronger. Kurdish culture has become highly vibrant. There is an ongoing process of both transmission and redefinition between different generations.

The women's movement has also been a crucial part of this transformation. There was already a women's movement before the PKK, but it became significantly stronger under the PKK’s influence. Today, there is a vast sociological difference between Kurdistan in 1984 and Kurdistan in 2024. However, within these changes, elements of continuity also persist.