Kamal Chomani is a political analyst and doctoral student at the University of Leipzig. In this interview with ANF, he answered questions about the sixth parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Parliamentary elections were held in the Kurdistan Region on Sunday. The last elections were held in 2018. Why were the elections not held after four years, as stipulated in the constitution?

The delay of the elections in the South Kurdistan Region is a clear sign that the political system has become completely dysfunctional and authoritarian. The ruling parties, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have constantly manipulated the democratic process to advance their own interests. These delays were deliberate and not merely administrative in nature. They arose from a deep fear that the elections would further expose their weakening legitimacy.

The two ruling families, Barzani and Talabani, no longer even bother to maintain the democratic facade. However, under pressure from the international community, the KDP was forced to hold elections. Neçirvan Barzani, who holds the office of South Kurdistan president, was responsible for setting the election date. Although he announced the date twice, both dates were canceled.

The PUK and other opposition parties refused to participate in the elections until two key demands were met. First, they insisted that the share of minorities should be reduced from eleven to five seats and that these seats should be distributed among the provinces. The PUK pushed for this demand because the KDP had abused the minority quota. The eleven seats, mainly in KDP-controlled areas, were won by KDP-affiliated figures across the board, guaranteed by the special voting of KDP-controlled Peshmerga forces. This system not only deprived minorities of their political agency and suppressed their rights, but also enabled the KDP to use these seats as a tool against the PUK and other opposition groups.

In the end, the Iraqi Supreme Court ruled in favor of the PUK, ensuring that minorities could represent themselves. The quota was reduced to five seats, and the total number of seats in the KRI parliament was reduced from 111 to 100. To its disappointment, however, the PUK used the same tactic as the KDP, using special Peshmerga votes to secure the two minority seats in Sulaymaniyah for PUK-affiliated candidates.

The second demand was that the Iraqi Supreme Election Commission should conduct the elections with the support of the United Nations, and this demand was also met.

This disregard for constitutional norms shows how entrenched they are in a power-sharing arrangement that prioritizes their control over the region, its resources and its people over a genuine democratic process.

They delay elections, manipulate votes and, when necessary, suppress the opposition voices to maintain their power. What we saw in these delayed elections was not a democratic exercise, but a calculated move to keep these dynasties in power. Parliament was closed for two years because the Supreme Court of Iraq ruled it unconstitutional for parliament to extend its mandate in 2022 - the year South Kurdistan was supposed to hold its elections.

Can you assess the election results for our readers?

The election results were predictable. The KDP has once again proven itself to be the dominant force in Hewlêr (Erbil) and Duhok, while the PUK has retained its power in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. While the Nifşê Nû (New Generation) movement has gained ground and become the third-strongest force in Kurdistan, its influence will be limited in a system dominated by the KDP and PUK's entrenched networks of patronage, militias and control over state institutions. The results cement the status quo: the KDP and PUK continue their monopolization of power, backed by their respective militias and economic empires.

The opposition parties, especially Gorran, have all but collapsed. The once promising force for change has become irrelevant due to its inability to present a coherent strategy. The collapse of Gorran is due to its internal conflicts and the takeover by the two sons of the late Gorran founder, Nawshirwan Mustafa. The New Generation, on the other hand, has taken advantage of popular discontent, but its numerical strength is unlikely to lead to any significant political change in the deeply corrupt KRI system. Not to mention that the New Generation's populism and neoliberal approach to solving problems is very disappointing, and it has no democratic structure. The party and its media are owned by a media mogul and businessman, Shaswar Abdulwahid. The party is reduced to Shaswar's ambitions without having a democratic structure. It is a businessman's party, nothing more.

Can elections change anything in such a system run by dynasties and militias?

I don't think so. Elections in South Kurdistan are a mere ritual, a notion that legitimizes the continued rule of the Barzani and Talabani families. This system is not designed to facilitate meaningful change, but to reproduce the power of those ruling dynasties. The KDP and PUK control the Peshmerga militias, deepen their influence over all state institutions, and manipulate the economy, making real democratic change impossible through elections alone.

What we are witnessing in each election cycle is not a competition for power, but a power-sharing agreement disguised as democracy. The elections provide a veneer of legitimacy, but the real decisions are made behind closed doors, where these families divide resources, governors, and ministries according to their interests, not the will of the people. Until the grip of these militias and the economic stranglehold of these families is broken, elections in South Kurdistan will remain a meaningless ritual.

Are the political parties in Kurdistan capable of forming a united front against the Iraqi central government and representing the interests of the people of Kurdistan?

No, the political parties in Kurdistan, especially the KDP and the PUK, are far too busy consolidating their own power to be able to effectively represent the interests of the Kurdish people or form a united front against Baghdad. Meanwhile, the PUK is much closer to Baghdad than Hewlêr. Moreover, the people of Kurdistan do not want these two parties to form a united front against Baghdad, but they want these two parties to work with Baghdad, as this is better for Kurdistan's economy and civil servants.

The KDP is using the tensions with Baghdad as a convenient distraction from its own corruption and failures. Although the PUK is seeking a better relationship with Baghdad, the position of the Iraqi presidency helps, but it has not been very successful so far. The KDP benefits from the perception that Kurdistan is under constant threat from the central government, which allows it to suppress internal dissent and avoid addressing critical issues such as corruption, governance and mismanagement. At the same time, the KDP uses the threat from Baghdad to continue its exclusive relations with Turkey and strengthen its access to natural resources, especially oil and gas.

In addition, the KDP and the PUK are more interested in dividing Kurdistan for their own benefit than uniting it. The KDP controls Erbil (Hewlêr) and Duhok, while the PUK controls Sulaymaniyah (Silêmanî) and Halabja. They operate as two separate administrations, each with its own agenda, and their competition with each other prevents them from taking a meaningful unified stance towards Baghdad. They do not represent Kurdish interests but their own political survival, using the central government as a scapegoat to cover up their internal failures.

The New Generation Movement has become the third-strongest force in Kurdistan, while Gorran has lost many votes. Can you comment on this?

The rise of the New Generation Movement and the collapse of Gorran are telling, but they also reflect the deep disillusionment of the Kurdish people with the traditional opposition. Gorran once embodied the hope for a new, progressive politics in Kurdistan, but was co-opted by the very system it claimed to fight. Its leadership compromised with the PUK, and it lost its legitimacy as a real opposition force. Gorran's failure to challenge the power structure enabled the rise of the New Generation Movement.

The success of the New Generation shows that there is still a demand for change in south Kurdistan, but the question remains whether it can maintain this momentum. While its rise to third place is promising, it faces the enormous challenge of breaking through the entrenched structures of KDP and PUK rule. Its ability to bring about real political change alongside the KDP-PUK duopoly is limited by the fact that the New Generation is led by a single man who is a businessman without ideology. He is a populist who uses undemocratic means to attack his opponents. He is a neoliberal character very similar to Donald Trump, but a Trump without any political ideology behind it. There is a possibility that the New Generation will join the new cabinet, in which Mesrûr Barzanî of the KDP will likely want to co-opt them and use them against the PUK, similar to how the KDP did in 2019.