The announcement of the decisions made at the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s 12th Congress has brought a new dimension to the ongoing debates on resolution and political process. Held on the basis of Abdullah Öcalan’s 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' issued on 27 February, the congress has raised expectations of the Turkish state to take steps toward resolving the Kurdish question through democratic means.

Journalist Eyüp Burç responded to ANF’s questions on the issue.

What do the PKK’s 12th Congress decisions mean in the context of the resolution debates? How do you interpret them?

The decisions announced by the PKK mark a new phase in the ongoing process. The 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' made on 27 February included the decision to dissolve the PKK and end the armed struggle. This was finalized at the congress, and in a way, that call has now been fulfilled.

This development signals a new stage in the Kurdish struggle for freedom and rights, and in their process of becoming a collective and political subject. It reflects a historical turning point in the conflict that has continued since the founding of the Republic. We are now entering a phase centered entirely on democratic struggle, moving away from the dynamics of armed conflict.

Would you describe this new phase as a legal and democratic struggle?

Post-conflict periods are processes of legal and democratic struggle. Like any legitimate form of resistance, democratic struggle is also legitimate. Based on fundamental rights and freedoms, the Kurdish people’s effort to be recognized as a collective subject is entirely a lawful struggle. From the Kurdish side, it is a struggle for a cause that holds moral superiority.

Therefore, with the armed phase now effectively consigned to history, this new stage will be one of democratic struggle. A legal foundation must be established for the transition from armed resistance to democratic engagement. For this process to evolve into lasting peace, justice and legal recognition must prevail.

The overwhelming majority of political actors in Turkey have supported the current phase. Still, there is a small segment that opposes it. Some are attempting to stir controversy over terms like 'Lausanne' and 'genocide' mentioned in the PKK’s congress statement. What do those disturbed by the PKK’s decision to disarm actually want? Do they want war?

These groups see themselves as having gained a certain level of power within the century-old state structure. I believe there are still elements within both the military and civilian bureaucracy that cling to policies of denial and destruction. Beyond that, there is also a segment shaped by the official ideology that has dominated the past century.

They tried to reproduce this official narrative within universities. From academia to the media, they sought to spread and regenerate an ideology built on uniformity. Some of the objections come from people influenced by this process. I see those shaped by a century of such education and manipulation as a natural consequence.

But there are also those who deliberately distort the situation. These people are not innocent. Therefore, the dissolution decision and the transformation of the Kurds are also triggering changes among their counterparts. Out of fear of this transformation, we are seeing demagogic distortions emerge.

How would you compare the current process with previous ones?

In fact, this process has existed since 1993. For those years, the idea of resolving the issue in Turkey through means other than conflict has consistently been on the agenda. The process that began between Turgut Özal and Abdullah Öcalan, shaped through diplomatic shuttle efforts and, to some extent, ceasefires, has experienced interruptions at various stages. From this perspective, one can say that a body of experience has accumulated in Turkey regarding this issue. These past efforts have laid the groundwork for today’s developments.

What makes the current process different from previous ones?

First of all, previous processes were shaped by many factors, conjunctural, regional, and global. Certain steps were taken when these factors aligned. But fundamentally, since 1993, the Kurdish movement has undergone a paradigmatic shift. It moved away from a paradigm of independence toward one centered on coexistence, a shared homeland, and ultimately, the pursuit of democratic solutions. Since 1993, Abdullah Öcalan’s efforts for peace have played a major role in shaping this approach.

I have personally witnessed various phases of this process, both as a journalist and as a Kurd. And it is precisely because of this paradigmatic shift that the use of arms has moved away from a state-building goal and toward a process of recognition and self-defense. That transformation is directly related to the current phase.

Today, international dynamics, regional conditions, and domestic developments in Turkey all play a role. What I’m trying to say is this: since 1993, regardless of the circumstances, the Kurdish movement has consistently upheld the idea that this issue must be resolved through nonviolent means. This has been a core principle from the beginning.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been driven to this point not through internal efforts alone, but largely due to regional and international developments. In that sense, the state’s evolving approach has been shaped more by external pressures than internal convictions.

At this point, both the regional and international balance of forces, as well as Turkey’s internal situation, are compelling both sides toward a solution. That is the reality we must recognize.

Would you describe this as a necessity?

 In a way, the objective conditions have brought necessity to the forefront. But subjectively, the Kurdish movement has always desired this path. The intent and effort were there from the beginning, and that must be acknowledged. However, Turkey defines this process as a 'Terror-Free Turkey.' There is a historical context to that framing as well.

Why do you think it is being called 'Terror-Free Turkey'?

In academic and international political terms, this is typically referred to as 'conflict resolution.' But to understand why it is being labeled 'Terror-Free Turkey,' we need to go back and look at the process that began with Turgut Özal.

Özal made serious efforts to solve this issue through security-based and eliminationist policies. We know about the village guard system, and the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (JITEM) unit, along with similar mechanisms. While implementing these measures, he also came to realize that they would not lead to a solution. For this reason, Özal believed that points of resistance within the state had to be transformed.

He began by initiating changes within the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Until that time, nearly all MIT undersecretaries had been retired generals. Generals who had not become Chief of General Staff would seek to become MIT undersecretary after retirement. Thus, the Turkish state stood on two main pillars: MİT and the military. Both had to be prepared for the process Özal wanted to initiate.

To that end, Özal began a process of civilianization within MIT. Two key figures emerged during this period: Emre Taner and Şenkal Atasagun. Both would later become MIT undersecretaries. Özal also attempted to change the prevailing traditions in the military. He abandoned seniority-based appointments and did what was necessary. In some ways, he tried to intervene in the military as well, but he was not able to achieve the desired results there.

We know that reports were written within the military stating that the Kurdish issue could not be resolved through security-focused policies. Later, just as Özal himself was pushed out, so too were commanders like Eşref Bitlis, those who were seeking a peaceful solution. However, one thing remained: the transformation initiated within MIT through civilianization.

 When Erdoğan came to power, the integration process with the European Union (EU) pushed him once again toward a resolution. Erdoğan attempted to revive one of the solution models that had already been developed.

In my view, the search for a solution within the state under Erdoğan took shape around two distinct models. This is how I categorize it based on my readings and assessments. One is the model led by Emre Taner, which is more liberal and democratic. The other is led by Şenkal Atasagun, and it represents a more conservative and nationalist approach.

Lately, Şenkal Atasagun’s name has been circulating behind the scenes...

Exactly. The solution model I describe as liberal and democratic, shaped by Emre Taner, was based on the idea of clearly identifying the problem: “Let us name it, the Kurdish question, and seek a solution to that question.” It was a model that defined the issue as such.

The other model, shaped by Şenkal Atasagun, took a different approach: “If we call this a Kurdish question, it will create a corresponding Turkish question. Therefore, let’s not call it the Kurdish question. Let’s call it a terrorism problem and launch a process to resolve terrorism.”

So, the terminology itself reflected two fundamentally different approaches. One sought a solution through recognizing and naming the Kurdish question. The other avoided that recognition and instead framed it as a terrorism issue, delaying the core matter.

But doesn’t this model also shape how the issue is perceived by society? Isn’t this 'terror' framing what creates confusion in people’s minds today?

Each of these models corresponds to a political party, whether in government or in opposition. They reflect attempts either to gain or maintain power. There is also a concern about how their political future will be affected. That’s why the societal dimension of this issue has always mattered to them in the resolution process.

Statements like 'Even if it’s poison, I will drink it,' or 'I won’t just put my hand, I’ll put my whole body under the stone,' are populist slogans. If only they reflected real commitment. But in truth, these parties calculate how the issue will be perceived by the public and what kind of reaction it may provoke. Ultimately, as each side takes steps based on the needs of the state, they also do so while planning their own political future.

That’s why there has been an effort to assign the task of avoiding the creation of a 'Turkish question' to a conservative, nationalist, pro-Turkish party like the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), or to leave the moderation of the process in its hands. Back in 2004, the resolution process was already being shaped around two models. Later, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) moved to the forefront. The process that began with the Oslo talks and later became known as the resolution process was born out of that approach.

The AKP sought to implement the project associated with Emre Taner, which we characterize as liberal and democratic. That process ended with the Dolmabahçe Agreement. Or as they put it, it was 'put into the freezer.' The moderation of the new phase was handed over to Devlet Bahçeli. By his side, as his advisor, sitting in the next room, is Şenkal Atasagun. That means the plan designed by Şenkal Atasagun is now in effect. And that is why this new process is being called “Terror-Free Turkey.”

The process is underway, but some say there are differences of opinion between Erdoğan and Bahçeli. As of today, Erdoğan seems to have effectively accepted this process. Yet, as in the past, the issue of democracy in Turkey remains a subject of ongoing debate. Do you think there is a real difference between Erdoğan and Bahçeli? Will Erdoğan’s fear of losing power keep the democracy issue on the agenda? And if it does, how might that affect the resolution process?

There is no way to resolve the Kurdish question through undemocratic means. That is absolutely clear. In my view, Erdoğan and Bahçeli have different perspectives. However, I do not believe that Erdoğan is inherently opposed to a resolution. But Erdoğan prioritizes his own political future above all else. He becomes a supporter of resolution only if it creates an opportunity that could help him win another term. Under normal conditions, I believe he would support a peaceful solution.

At the moment, his primary concern seems to be not the survival of the state, but his own political survival. His approach appears to be: “If this process can help me get re-elected, I will open the door to it. If it distances me from power, I will shut it down.” Erdoğan has swayed back and forth in this manner before.

It seems this has already been tested. During the previous resolution process, Turkey experienced a degree of democratic opening, and then Erdoğan lost the June 7 elections.

Yes, you’re right. But Erdoğan experienced a kind of entrapment. In his effort to rid the country of tutelage, he ended up replacing it with his own form of control. He promised to end corruption, yet his time in power has been marked by widespread corruption. In that sense, it wasn’t the atmosphere of democratization that weakened his power, it was his own political practice.

Therefore, there is no possible resolution to the Kurdish question outside democratic means. How else could it be solved? Without implementing decentralization, without establishing a stronger model of local governance, how can you address the Kurdish issue? There is a direct link between resolving the Kurdish question and democratization. That is why Erdoğan’s regime must come to terms with whatever consequences democratization may bring for them.

What happens if they refuse to accept this? Could it lead to a rupture between the AKP and the MHP? And how might that affect the process?

From what I observe, the way the MHP frames and approaches this issue differs somewhat from the AKP. Over the past few days, they may appear to be aligned, but the MHP defines this process as a matter of state survival.

Therefore, if the AKP, meaning Erdoğan, prioritizes his own political survival over that of the state, I believe the two parties will eventually part ways. That’s my opinion. It’s not a far-fetched assumption, because their methods and perspectives are already clearly on display.

If we analyze it from this angle, one side turns the issue into a matter of personal survival, while the other declares it a matter of state continuity. So, will a century be sacrificed for one man’s next five years in office? In such a case, I believe the alliance between the AKP and the MHP would crack. The MHP could adopt a different political stance altogether.