The South African lawyer Brian Currin is now in Liberia, working with a mediators teams. In the past five years he has been involved in facilitating the search for a political solution to the conflict in the Basque Country. Currin was instrumental in the establishment, in South Africa, of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Indeed he had been appointed to in 1994 by president Nelson Mandela to chair a Prions Audit Committee. He was then co-chair of the Sentence Review Commission in the North of Ireland. That is the commission which decides on the early release of political prisoners. In 2000 he returned to the North of Ireland as an independent mediator in the so called Drumcree parading dispute (the Portadown orangemen though withdrew from dialogue).

We reached him in Liberia to talk about the process in the Basque country. The interview was made on the 17 of November, so before the 20 November elections.

- How would you assess the results achieved so far in the Basque country?

I think that to get to a point where ETA declares a definitive end to the armed struggle is a very significant achievement. They themselves have said that in an interview, recently [published in Gara, 11 November 2011]. It was a very significant moment in their own history but also very significant for politics in the Basque country because it means that in future there can be a peace process with multi party negotiations involving anyone without being any reason or excuse for anyone not to participate. And also it would unable the pro independent left (Abertzale Left) to be part of it as equal partners. Obviously, negotiating with on one hand a gun to the head - which was the way in which the Spanish government as well as I must say other parties in the Basque country as well were seeing ETA (and one can understand that)- well, to negotiate with a gun to your head is really not a way to negotiate. On the side of the Abertzale Left to negotiate when you are essentially regarded as criminals, when you are subject to massive security measures, with your leadership in and out of detention and prison, from their perspective I think, it was also concretely impossible to negotiate.

So what has been achieved has changed the dynamic completely. I think it is a very significant development for the Basque country.

- Now the onus is on the Spanish and French governments. What to expect from them?

I was naively optimistic thinking that there would be a response fairly soon after the ETA declaration. I think probably it was an unrealistic expectation. A government that is facing the probability of a last at the polls can't really start an initiative of this nature in the final days of their office. So I suppose it was unrealistic. I think I am confident that sometime early in 2012 after the new government takes office, wether it is the Socialist Party or Popular Party - and probably it would be the latter - that they will respond positively to the declaration. I think that probably France will respond positively at around the same time and I am confident that they will enter into discussions with ETA exclusively around the consequences of the violence. I am optimistic or confident that it will happen because ETA's declaration was unconditional, there were no substantive demands and the request from the international community essentially to talk about final end of a period of violence is something which, quite frankly, cannot be rejected because it would be equivalent to rejecting peace. And I am absolutely sure that no government would want to reject peace. So I am sure that there will be that engagement sometime in the new year.

- How important has been the civil society involvement in the process?

Civil society was an absolutely essential partner in the process. And when I talk about civil society I am not only referring to civil society organisations, such as the trade unions, the church and other, but I am also referring to the society in general, the people of the Basque country. And in particular the role of the constituency of the Abertzale Left was also very significant, because they themselves were demanding a new political project and to some extent what happened was in response to the constituency of the Abertzale Left who clearly felt that the political project of many decades was no longer working. So if one takes that constituency and as I said various civil society organisations and if you also looked at the political parties who are not major players in government, and I am referring to the smaller nationalist parties in the Basque country, all of them were engaging with Abertzale Left and Abertzale Left was in turn engaging with them and asking for role support. It was really through all these discussions between all the parties and the civil society organisations and the constituency of Abertzale Left and the broader society in the Basque country that the message became clear. To the political leadership they needed to give leadership and there had to be a new strategy, a new political project. Fortunately that political leadership was mature, they themselves had courage and they understood their challenges. Of course their challenges related to bring ETA in their totality on board, and this was one of their big challenge, and they listened to their constituency, they gave leadership and together as partners they, I think, brought about the results that we are now witnessing.

- Going back years, to the North of Ireland peace process in which you had a role, there was a strong emphasis on the "vested interests" of the parties involved in the conflict. Which differences would you see between Ireland and the Basque Country?

I don't agree that it was the armed organisation, the paramilitary to do the first step in Ireland. One can't look at what was happening in the North of Ireland. We have to look at what was happening between the Republican movement and the British government. There had been secret engagement between them for many many years. And the ceasefire which came about in 1994 had been negotiated. You have to remember also that although the Republican movement declared the ceasefire which then gave rise to the process, when they declared the ceasefire there was an understanding, there was an agreement as to what was going to be the response to that by the British government. So to some extent there was a road map that had been laid out. So, it wasn't a unilateral step taken by the Provisional IRA, and we also have to remember that it took many years for the Provisional IRA even well into the peace process to agree to decommission arms and to say that the war is over. They didn't say that the war was over prior to the Good Friday Agreement [signed on 10 April 1998], they did not say the war was over even well into the Good Friday Agreement. So it wasn't in many instances an unilateral step by the Provisional IRA. And I would say obviously in South Africa was different. There also it was pretty much a joint initiative but then the South African government trough De Clerk took some very bold steps. In the Basque Country it was different because the previously ceasefires that had been negotiated never ever held because, from the perspective of ETA, Madrid did not comply with their commitments as they went into negotiations, and ETA felt quite free then to breach the ceasefire. ETA understood, well certainly the Abertzale Left understood, that essentially there will not be another peace process unless weapons were taken out of the agenda completely and I think the Abertzale Left also understood that unilateral action in this instance was better then setting conditions. Because they came to the conclusion that maybe Madrid did not want this outcome and so if this is the case, if they were correct, if you set conditions to Madrid, Madrid just does not comply with the conditions and there is no progress. And that's one of the reasons why they decided to proceed and take unilateral action so they maintained control and could manage its own process of transformation from violence to exclusively peaceful means.

As for vested interests. Well I don't know whether from the perspective of ETA they have less vested interests to defend. I mean from their perspective, the Abertzale Left perspective, they are defending the right to a nation: I mean that's huge. That's their vested interest. And notwithstanding the fact that that is their interest - their nationhood is what they are essentially, from their perspective, struggling for - they were willing to take the step and correctly so I think. So I don't think the interest they had was any less than the interest of Madrid in maintaining a unitary Spain.

- So what you are saying is that in Ireland negotiations have started before the IRA ceasefire, whereas in the Basque Country they would start now.

Yes, the negotiations would only start now. Look, the negotiations that went on before the Good Friday Agreement were not substantive negotiations. They were negotiations around confidence building measures. They were talking about issues relating to prisoners, they were talking about issues relating to security legislation, they were talking about enabling their leaders in prison to be able to participate in the negotiations, they were talking mainly about confidence building measures. And also I think that the message that was given to Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein that, there is a ceasefire, we can start substantive negotiations. And I am sure there were indications as to what sort of principles would inform those negotiations. So it was not just a question of Sinn Fein and IRA to get the ceasefire and waiting for an answer from the British government. It was not like that at all, whereas this is how it happened here in the Basque country.

But the instructions, request, from international leaders on 17 October to the Spanish and French government, was that: now you need to sit down and you need to talk about those confidence building measures, those issues which are the consequences of the violence. And those are the issues that relate to the question of decommissioning arms. So one of the consequence of violence is that there is an organisation which is sitting on unlawful possession of arms and ammunition, those arms and ammunition needs to be decommissioned. I am sure that those are the issues the Spanish and French governments would want to talk about. They need to know where the arms are and to have them destroyed. If ETA leadership are going to do that, they would want those people who managed these weapons to be safeguarded in some way. They would want some kind of indemnity for those people, they are not going to say, ok we do it and put us in jail. So there is going to be some kind of indemnity from prosecution.

Then there is the question of prisoners which is another consequence of the violence. Not only there are over 500 prisoners in various jails, but they are dispersed. And they are only dispersed because of the nature of offences they have committed. So now that the violence is over there is no justification to keep them away from their houses.

And then there are prisoners serving far longer sentences that they would serve in normal circumstances because of the war legislation. We need to be talking about those prisoners. Can they be released? when can they be released ?… those are issues that would build confidence, trust. At the same time that this is happening the political parties in the Basque Country would begin to prepare themselves. All parties, except from the Popular Party have indicated that they are ready and willing to enter into negotiations around the real political conflict… is not about ETA is about the substantial political issue. And those negotiations within the Basque Country need to happen.

- What will be the role of the International Contact Group in this new reality?

We are going to meet in December to do a review of the status quo. We have a mandate. And this mandate came out of lengthy consultations. That mandate now needs to be looked at in the context of the new reality. We will be reviewing that mandate given the new political reality and in the new year we will go back to the political parties and we will consult and ask them about how they see our role given the new political reality. Because we can only act as International Contact Group, which is not in anyway a governmental International Contact Group, we are a non governmental International Contact Group - we can only really do as much as the local parties mandate us to do. So our future role must be determined by the mandate we get from the political parties in the Basque Country.

- How do you see the future of the role of international mediation. The international community has shown that it can have a role for peace and not a role for war like

NATO and governments are saying and doing...

You are absolutely right, there are many examples of how international mediators often in partnership with UN have played a significant mediation role. In fact I am now in Liberia. Ireland is another example, where some who first were not positive about it then recognised that indeed the role was important because the international mediators came with new ideas and really helped the process… I think you are correct in saying there is a very very important future role for international mediation. Having said that we do find in certain instances, and Spain is an example, that the host countries does not always welcome international mediators, they would consider it an interference in their internal affairs. You know how much I was vilified in Spain for my involvement, how much certain political circles have tried to discourage me from getting involved. But you know I think that one would hope that a case of this nature, where the results indicate that international involvement can be effective, is able to assist the parties in reaching a stage where violence ends and real politics begin may assist, may be a lesson for other governments who might instinctively want to discourage international mediation not to do so but rather to welcome international mediation.