Abdullah Öcalan’s 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' marked a critical turning point in the ongoing debates surrounding the “process” that has continued since October.

In response to this call, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced on May 12 that it had officially dissolved itself.

Recently, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), proposed the formation of a parliamentary commission, but the ruling bloc has so far responded with hesitation.

Academic and author Mehmet Ufuk Uras spoke to ANF about the ongoing process. We publish the first part of the interview.

In October, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli issued a call, and later, on February 27, Kurdish people’s leader Abdullah Öcalan made his “Call for Peace and a Democratic Society.” Following this, the PKK announced that it had laid down its arms and dissolved itself. This stage is being described as a new phase. How do you see it?

We are in a very positive phase, and I believe the most difficult part is now behind us. There has been a shift in line with the paradigm and perspective introduced by Abdullah Öcalan, and as we expected, the PKK has announced its decision to dissolve. From this point on, the focus will be on more tactical and practical steps, such as the process of disarmament.

The key concepts of this process are change and transformation. It’s not only about the reorganization of structures in Syria and coordination with a Syria-based administration, but also about the transformation of the state structure itself. In that sense, it is about a democratic constitution, a democratic parliament, and a democratic republic. The synchronization of these elements will be essential.

You said the hardest part is over, but no concrete steps have yet been taken. In legal and institutional terms, nothing has happened. If we were to measure the progress of this process, where are we exactly?

We cannot say that nothing has been done. The decision to dissolve, in other words, the PKK’s congress, was the most critical part of the process. The proposal by Devlet Bahçeli to establish a parliamentary commission that includes all parties and to define a framework is also significant. So, in that sense, we could say that the third phase has largely been completed, and we are now entering the fourth. This summer will be a period of intense work, especially in terms of the socialization of the peace process. There will be concentrated efforts to ensure the process is embraced by society.

Devlet Bahçeli was the one who initiated this process, and his move came as a surprise to many. Was it also unexpected for you? You had a meeting with Bahçeli, and it has been said that you also played a role in this process. Where do you see yourself in it?

It was indeed a surprise for all of us. I met with Mr. Bahçeli in consultation with the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). Prior to that meeting, I had discussions with Tuncer Bakırhan and Ayşegül Doğan. We reached a consensus and even debated whether it would be appropriate to share it with the public.

During my meeting with Bahçeli, he emphasized the importance of involving civil society organizations in the process. I sensed a certain political determination there. But it was also clear that this was not merely a personal initiative. It became evident that the state apparatus, including the context of Syria, has been working on this issue for about a year.

After the meeting with Bahçeli, I briefed Mr. Ahmet Türk and shared the details of the process. That was our role, to facilitate and accelerate the process as someone who could be accepted by both sides and who could engage in dialogue without difficulty.

At the same time, we maintained contact with global actors through the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI). Most recently, we met with ambassadors in Ankara to assess the process. What I observed there is that the global network is, to a large extent, positioned as a complementary part of this process. Because, in terms of the Middle East, there is no Plan B.

There has been talk of potential dangers for Turkey following Bahçeli’s move. Some claim that international powers oppose this process, while others argue that they are involved in it. What impressions did you get from your meetings and contacts?

This is not a matter that can be explained through the personal initiatives or rivalries of political parties. Consider the recent global developments, from Donald Trump’s remark about treating Netanyahu ‘like Zelensky,’ to the performance displayed regarding Syria, and the subsequent diplomatic dynamics involving Emmanuel Macron. At a certain level, Syria, under its new administration, appears to be moving in sync with global sensitivities.

To tie all of these processes solely to domestic political competition in Turkey, for example, to say, ‘Erdoğan is taking these steps just to be re-elected,’ or to claim, ‘That’s why Assad was overthrown, that’s why Iran stepped back, that’s why Israel attacked Palestine’, amounts to parody or dark satire.

Some actors may indeed be benefiting from the outcomes, but explaining the entire process as a form of petty political squabbling would be a superficial interpretation. What we are witnessing is the end of the world as we knew it, and the transition into a new one. Every political actor is now positioning themselves accordingly.

There have been claims of a difference in approach between Erdoğan and Bahçeli. What is your view on this?

 I did not get that impression at all. In fact, during our meeting, Bahçeli stated that his position was aligned with President Erdoğan’s initiative. It’s clear that this is the result of careful consideration and planning. Strangely enough, and this may sound odd to you, we’ve spent our lives working on social opposition and the development of civil society. Why? Because we believed the state was a mechanism that regulates and controls civil society. But in this current process, oddly, the state’s political mind seems to be far ahead of civil society. When we look at some of the objections coming from civil society, it’s surprising to see that the state has actually taken the lead by several steps.

This suggests that while we were busy reacting to daily politics and trying to respond to one another, a more strategic operation was underway behind the scenes. Now, it is civil society and the broader opposition that are trying to catch up. This is something we haven’t really seen before, it’s quite unusual. And if you look at nationalist movements globally, they tend to be aligned with the state. Here, however, we see nationalist movements that are in conflict with the state. I am referring specifically to the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi) and the Good Party (İYİ Parti). We know that nationalist movements that operate ‘in spite of the state’ like these are unlikely to succeed. So, there is a kind of upheaval happening within the nationalist camp.

The reason I did not initially share the details of these meetings with the public is because even within the DEM Party, I encountered some strange criticisms. I told the DEM Party leadership, ‘Yes, it’s fine to be discreet, but not to this extent. At the very least, inform your own components. They need to stop stalling with delay tactics.’ The need to go public came in response to these unusual criticisms.

Are your contacts and your role in this process still ongoing?

We assumed it would continue if needed. Of course, we are maintaining discussions in the background. For example, through the DPI, we have held talks in Ankara with the leadership of the DEM Party, as well as with representatives from the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi), and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA Partisi). In the coming period, we also plan to meet with other parties. But the process itself is moving forward. At this stage, there does not appear to be a specific need for someone to assume an active role as an accelerator or facilitator.

Will this process proceed according to evolving needs, or is there a clear roadmap? How do you see the next steps unfolding?

From this point forward, the parliamentary phase will take place in full view of the public. Our focus has mostly been on creating consensus and ensuring that this issue becomes a matter of broad social ownership. We held discussions with intellectuals and writers around this principle. But the process moved so quickly that there was no need to take a special initiative. It is advancing much faster than we had anticipated. While social media can sometimes create distortions, overall, there is real public support.

During the Dolmabahçe process, we never saw state action as a guarantee. We told the leadership of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) that steps had to be taken to ensure socialization. In this regard, we need public intellectuals, writers, and artists who, much like Sırrı Süreyya Önder did in the past, can help bring this process into the public sphere.

We are currently facing an enormous wave of disinformation. Some try to frame the PKK’s recent announcement as if Turkey is finally preparing to introduce a democratic constitution and reforms, but the Treaty of Lausanne is supposedly an obstacle. As if there’s some kind of historical deadlock. But what could be more natural than the PKK, as a political movement, having a different interpretation of history? I have never seen any peace process or international conflict resolution effort derailed by historical differences like this.

In fact, if the PKK did not think differently, we wouldn’t be having a conversation about peace at all.

I believe these barriers have largely been overcome. The walls, so to speak, have mostly come down, and that is incredibly valuable. Previously, even in television appearances, we avoided proposing certain ideas just to protect the integrity of the process. Now we feel more at ease.

The fact that Devlet Bahçeli publicly thanked Abdullah Öcalan marks the removal of major mental and ideological barriers. This will significantly accelerate the process. Because building a shared history, one co-authored by Turks and Kurds alike, is essential. Some may still fail to recognize the value of this, but in my view, they either feel left out or have grown dependent on the status quo. Those groups should not be taken seriously.

We are talking about a century-old issue, and the damage it has caused over the past hundred years. There are many aspects that still need to be addressed: confronting the past, repairing the damage, ensuring it does not happen again, and initiating legal and constitutional reforms. Even if the hardest part is said to be over, what must still be discussed?

This process carries with it a sense of continuity. If you pay close attention, the PKK referred to the revolutionary generation of 1968 in the statement accompanying its congress decision. It sees itself as part of that struggle. May 18 marked the anniversary of the death of Ibrahim Kaypakkaya. When you look at the entire arc of this process, it is clear that there is continuity. A political will is being asserted to shape the future.

Those who see this as surrender or weakness are misreading the process. What we are witnessing, in both Syria and Turkey, is a shared act of will and legitimacy to rebuild the future together. That alone is an extraordinary achievement. In time, people will recognize this.

Nelson Mandela went through the same thing. People asked, ‘Will you negotiate with De Klerk?’ And Mandela responded, ‘I would negotiate with the devil himself.’ So when people say, ‘Should we negotiate with the government?’, well, are you going to negotiate with the government of Madagascar instead? The point is that real negotiations must take place with actual actors and centers of power.

Criticism based on what I would call ‘canteen politics’ or adolescent-style opposition has no real substance. What truly matters now is the rehabilitation process, the effort to build a shared collective memory, as you rightly pointed out.

Once the security risks along the Turkey–Syria border are resolved, we will begin to see rapid steps on various fronts: a new law on local administrations, changes to the law on state-appointed trustees, a narrower and more precise legal definition of terrorism, reforms to the municipal law, and amendments to the penal code. These moves will accelerate public support for the process as well.

The role of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) is especially critical here. Their inclusion in the process is essential, and they appear willing to participate, despite nationalist pressures from within their own base.

Bahçeli once used the metaphor of a ‘two-winged bird’, and a bird cannot fly with just one wing. That is why no one should be excluded from this process. Everyone must remain within its scope. And it seems we are moving in that direction.