ANF spoke about the developments in Syria with Professor Hamit Bozarslan of the Paris School of Social Sciences.

HTS’s (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) attack on Aleppo led to the collapse of the Assad regime. How do you evaluate the regime’s rapid collapse without any resistance?

It is important to understand this well: the Damascus government collapsed almost without any resistance. We’ve seen this happen in some cases before. The fall of Mosul in 2014 and Kabul in 2021 are perhaps the clearest examples. Looking at the events, it is clear that the Syrian regime has decayed from within and has turned into a hollow structure.

At the same time, the forces supporting the Assad regime have clearly consumed their resources in a kind of suicidal process. Among these forces, Hezbollah can be counted first. If it weren’t for Hezbollah, the regime would not have survived in 2013. Hezbollah lost its resources in the highly bloody conflict it entered with Israel.

On the other hand, Iran’s militia strategy and diplomacy in the Middle East have now reached their final point and have fallen into a position where they cannot renew themselves. Russia has also had to waste its human and military resources in a senseless war front.

In light of all this, the collapse of the Damascus government is not due to the strength of HTS, but rather to the regime’s internal decay.

Should we view what happened in Syria as a continuation of the process that started after the Hamas attacks on October 7th?

Yes, what is happening in Syria is inevitably a continuation of the process that started after the Hamas attacks on October 7th. No one was expecting the attacks on October 7th. After these attacks, on October 8th, Hezbollah started its own attacks, and Israel gained a very important advantage. Activities in Gaza and Lebanon were presented as a form of self-defense. Since that time, there have been repeated calls within Israel’s general staff and political circles for the restructuring of the Middle East.

The most critical part of this restructuring plan was Lebanon. The break in relations between Lebanon and Iran, and in this context, Syria’s need to cease being a bridge between Lebanon and Iran, was emphasized. However, this does not mean that everything that happened is entirely Israel’s fault. In fact, Israel and the U.S. did not foresee that the Syrian regime was so consumed and that it would collapse so quickly.

However, their goal was to create a situation where the regime would be extremely weakened, and if possible, Syria would be divided into two or three regions. In this regard, it can be said that what happened was also a surprise for Israel. There are also some concerns within Israel because, ultimately, Israel may face the possibility of neighboring a “Jihadistan” entity.

Therefore, it is not correct to attribute everything that happened solely to Israel, but the events did emerge as a result of the October 7th attacks.

Do you agree with the claim that Turkey played the biggest role in the collapse of the Assad regime?

Yes, this is true. However, Turkey did not expect such a development either. No one, including Turkey, anticipated that Damascus would fall without the slightest resistance. It is known that the attack launched by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, i.e., a jihadist group, came from the Turkish-controlled area in Syria. It is also clear that much of their weapons, equipment, and their training likely came from Turkey. However, this does not necessarily mean that HTS is a puppet of Turkey. Yet, it seems quite difficult for such a scenario to unfold without Turkey’s permission or without the Turkish army’s control over the area, allowing them to reach Damascus.

What kind of scenario could emerge in Syria in the upcoming period? Is there a possibility of Syria being divided into three parts?

It is impossible to assess exactly what is happening in Syria right now because we cannot even foresee what will happen in the next 24 hours. There are enormous dangers ahead.

The first danger is the continuation of the militia mentality. One of the biggest problems in Syria for the last 10-15 years has been the presence of a militia mentality and the weakness of the state. The Assad regime itself eventually turned into a militia movement, sharing power with other militias. HTS, on the other hand, preferred to remain a militia force rather than establishing a real and rational state by forming its own government. This situation may inevitably lead to the creation of other militias.

The second danger is the loss of expectations for a democratic future in Syria. If we recall 2011, there was an expectation for a pluralistic and secular Syria. Although HTS is trying to modernize itself now, it still cannot shake off its identity as a jihadist or radical Islamist movement. This creates a serious concern for the future.

The third danger is the potential for violence in Syria. This potential has always existed, but now it is uncertain what elements of the Baath or Assad regime, who have lost power, will do. These elements have extensive internal connections and significant sources of violence. This increases the likelihood that they will resort to violence in the future.

The fourth issue is the Rojava issue. Turkey wants to eliminate Rojava. It is understood that the U.S. aims to prevent such a scenario. It is still unclear to what extent the U.S. under the Trump administration will intervene in Syria and the Kurdish issue. Many of the appointed figures are known to be pro-Kurdish and protested the attacks on Rojava in 2019. It is, however, not possible to give a definitive opinion on what their stance will be in the new period.

The last issue is the Israeli question. Israel has taken control of the entire Golan Heights and is only 40-50 kilometers away from Damascus. This situation will likely create problems in the Arab world and particularly in Syria. It is uncertain how the new Syrian government will respond to this and how it will react. Israel’s expectations from Syria are also not clear at the moment.

Given all this, it is necessary to be extremely cautious. In an environment where even 3-4 hours ahead cannot be predicted, it is not possible to make definitive comments about Syria’s future.

During this process, we saw that Turkey-supported and Turkey-linked groups attacked the Autonomous Administration areas in North and East Syria and occupied some regions. At the same time, we witnessed that the U.S. did not prevent this. How should we evaluate the U.S. stance?

Yes, during this process, we did not see the U.S. play a different role, but it is known that voices from the U.S. and Israel have raised concerns about the protection of the Kurds. From what I understand, it will be quite difficult for the Kurds to hold onto the western side of the Euphrates. This is part of a policy Turkey has been applying since 1925, and we know that this policy has spread to Syria. The U.S. will likely allow this scenario, but perhaps consolidation can be achieved in the eastern part of Rojava. I think Kurdish movements are aware of this. According to information I obtained from the media, it is said that the U.S. mediated between the SDF and the Syrian National Army in Manbij, leading to an agreement. If this is true, it is clear that we are heading towards such a scenario.

The HTS and its leader are being presented as saviors in the West. However, this group and its leader have connections with ISIS, and their origins are based on a very similar tradition. How do you view the West's approach to this?

First and foremost, it is important to understand that the Assad regime has been holding Syria captive for the last 60 years. In 2011, groups supporting the regime said, "Either Bashar or we will burn the country down." We are talking about the deaths of 500,000 people, tens of thousands of prisoners, and 7-8 million people displaced. In his speech in 2016, Assad said, "We have lost the infrastructure and our youth, which would have taken decades to rebuild, but we have become a better society." In other words, we should not forget the dictatorship and tyranny of Assad.

There is a sense of victory intoxication in overthrowing this dictatorship. The last dictator who didn't fall in 2011 has fallen today, but after this intoxication of victory, there will be an awakening. The regime that will replace the fallen one is still very far from a democratic, human rights-based, pluralistic, and secular perspective for Syria.

We saw this in the case of Afghanistan. With such a reality before the international community, isn't it contradictory to accept HTS today? If we look further back, during the emergence of ISIS, perhaps if ISIS hadn't exported its violence to Europe, its existence would have been more acceptable, wouldn't it?

Yes, if ISIS had not exported its violence to Europe and showed such brutal scenes, it might have been more accepted by Europe and the U.S. Also, there is no such thing as an international community. If it exists, it appears to be a community with no memory. It makes decisions on a daily basis, with no long-term strategy, and lacks the capacity to understand the world. If this regime continues in Syria tomorrow and new radicalization processes begin, we will all witness its effects, but it seems there is a major failure in reading these developments.

Another significant fact is the power vacuum currently occurring in the U.S. This situation seems to persist until January. As far as I know, there are very close contacts between both administrations. This vacuum is also bringing about certain developments.

On the other hand, we must not forget that there is blindness and cowardice in democracies. This blindness and cowardice made it inevitable for democracies to pay a heavy price in the 20th century. We saw this in Spain and during World War II. The same thing happened in Ukraine in the 21st century. Based on the current democratic elites, I can say that it seems impossible for democracies to learn from their past and experiences.

With HTS marching towards Damascus and Turkey-backed groups attacking the Autonomous Administration regions, we also saw ISIS beginning to mobilize again. How willing will the HTS be to fight ISIS? What difficulties will the new government face in preventing its resurgence?

I don’t know, because there were bloody conflicts between HTS and ISIS in the past. ISIS's autonomy came as a result of these conflicts. After 2017, a significant number of surviving ISIS militants were in Idlib and the areas controlled by the Turkish army. Therefore, there is both a high level of tension and ongoing organic relations. We don’t know what kind of situation we will face tomorrow. ISIS could seek autonomy again and adopt a strategy of conflict, trying to seize the territories controlled by HTS. This is definitely possible, but we don’t know how long it will take, nor do we have definitive information about ISIS’s current elite cadres and fighting power.

It is a fact that ISIS has not disappeared and continues to exist as an active force. This is true not only for Syria but also for Iraq. ISIS is not completely finished in Iraq either.