Patrick Seale: Syrian uprising not yet life-threatening for the regime
Patrick Seale: Syrian uprising not yet life-threatening for the regime
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.
Born in Belfast, in the North of Ireland, he was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and read Middle East history at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He studied Arabic at the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies in Lebanon. His journalistic experience includes six years with Reuters, and over twelve with The Observer (London). He has covered the Middle East, Africa and India. Patrick Seale lives in France. He is currently working on his new book. He has agreed to answer some questions by ANF about the current political situation in Syria.
* Do you think the opposition in Syria has any chance to topple President Bashar al-Asad?
The first thing to remember about the Syrian crisis is that so long as the army and security services remain loyal to President Bashar al-Asad -- and so long as his regime remains united -- it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition to topple him.
There have been reports of some military defections. But these appear to be on a small scale. So far, neither the regime nor the army has cracked.
There have been rumours of dissension within the ruling group – in particular between the President on the one hand and his hard-line brother Maher al-Asad, commander of key army units, and his cousin Hafiz Makhlouf, a security chief, on the other. But these are only rumours. So far no overt split has emerged and President Bashar still seems to be in command.
* And yet clearly the Syrian regime has not handled the crisis in a proper manner.
There is no doubt, however, that the regime has badly mishandled the crisis. The children who drew graffiti on a wall in Daraa last March should not have been arrested and beaten – the incident which sparked the uprising. The use of live fire against protesters, the killings, the mass arrests and torture which have followed have all gravely damaged the regime’s image and undercut its legitimacy.
* Why do you think the uprising is not yet life-threatening for Bashar al-Asad?
The uprising is not yet life-threatening for the regime, and this for three main reasons: A foreign intervention (on the Libyan model) is highly unlikely, if not totally impossible. No Western country has the stomach for an adventure of this sort – and certainly not the U.S. nor any European country. Second, Syria’s neighbours – and the international community as a whole – are worried about the possible regional repercussions of a Syrian collapse. They want stability, not chaos. Among the questions being asked are the following: Would the fall of the Syrian regime re-ignite the Lebanese civil war? Would it threaten the calm on Israel’s border? Would it affect the delicate confessional balance in Iraq at a time when the U.S. is preparing to withdraw its remaining troops? How would Iran, Syria’s main regional ally, react? And – last but not least – what would be the impact of a Syrian collapse on Turkey’s Arab policy? Syria is a key element in Turkey’s regional policy. These worries by the international community are assets for President Bashar, and will help keep him in power, at least for the time being. And third, President Bashar has allies at home. It is by no means certain that the protest movement has the support of a majority in the country.
* What is the line up in the country, for and against the regime?
For the regime: The main commanders of the army and security forces; the Alawi community, to which the President belongs; the Christian community (about 10% of the population), fearful of what might happen to it if an Islamic regime were to come to power; the middle and upper classes in the two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo; the Sunni merchants in these cities have been traditional allies of the Asad regime. Also a ‘new bourgeosie’ which has prospered over the last decade by the liberalisation of the economy and which has benefited from the inflow of foreign investment, the introduction of private banks and insurance companies; the launch of a stock exchange; the opening of many new hotels and restaurants to cope with the surge in tourism; the rehabilitation of the old cities in Damascus and Aleppo as well as archaeological sites and other tourist attractions, etc. And then the relatively non-political ‘silent majority’ that prefers security and stability to political freedoms, and does not want Syria to suffer the dreadful fate of Iraq, shattered by the American invasion and occupation, or Lebanon, shattered by a 15 year civil war.
Against the regime: The rural poor, devastated by four or five years of drought, which has forced hundreds of thousands of farmers off their land to shanty towns around the main cities. Unemployed youth. The whole Arab world has suffered from a population explosion. Schools and universities are over-populated and over-stretched. They turn out tens of thousands of semi-educated youth for whom there are no jobs. This has been the motor of the revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen -- and also in Syria.
Small businessmen who have been unable to make money because of the corruption of big businessmen close to the regime. Intellectuals frustrated by the lack of freedom of expression or of association, and the absence of a free press. A slice of the population outraged by corruption and police brutality.
An Islamist opposition – some of it affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood – that wants revenge for the Hama massacres of 1982, and has a fervently-held ambition to overthrow what it considers a godless Alawi regime.
Last but not least, groups of exiled dissidents in London, Paris, Brussels, New York, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf... These exiles have raised money for their cause of toppling the Asad regime and have also had some financial support from the US over the past decade. They seem to have been able to supply the protesters with satellite telephones, with financial and media support, with propaganda – and perhaps even with arms.
There certainly seems to be an armed element in the street opposition, which has managed to kill several dozen soldiers and policemen. It is easy to smuggle arms into Syria across its porous borders with Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.
* What about the Kurds ?
The Kurds have been relatively quiet. Early in the crisis, President Bashar issued a decree giving citizenship (at last) to a great many stateless Kurds. This seems to have satisfied one at least of their demands – and a major one.
* President Bashar has called for a National Dialogue.
Yes, this is the important new element in a confused situation: President Bashar’s call for a National Dialogue. This has already had some consequences. Some 200 opposition members (if not the most virulent ones) have held a meeting in Damascus, which might be followed by others. The opposition has still not produced a credible leader or group of leaders. It seems to be split between those who want to work with the regime to produce a new and more liberal Syria and those who simply want to get rid of the regime altogether. If the former group emerge on top, this could result in a real dialogue between regime and opposition.
Meanwhile, the army has been withdrawn from some cities, such as Hama. The regime seems to be attempting to create the right atmosphere for a dialogue by allowing some freedom for peaceful demonstrations. It looks as if President Bashar wants to implement some reforms – some restrictions on the use of force by his security services, some freedom for the press, some reforms of the prison service, some curbing of corruption, some release of political prisoners – so long as these do not threaten his hold on power.
Born in Belfast, in the North of Ireland, he was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and read Middle East history at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He studied Arabic at the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies in Lebanon. His journalistic experience includes six years with Reuters, and over twelve with The Observer (London). He has covered the Middle East, Africa and India. Patrick Seale lives in France. He is currently working on his new book. He has agreed to answer some questions by ANF about the current political situation in Syria.
* Do you think the opposition in Syria has any chance to topple President Bashar al-Asad?
The first thing to remember about the Syrian crisis is that so long as the army and security services remain loyal to President Bashar al-Asad -- and so long as his regime remains united -- it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition to topple him.
There have been reports of some military defections. But these appear to be on a small scale. So far, neither the regime nor the army has cracked.
There have been rumours of dissension within the ruling group – in particular between the President on the one hand and his hard-line brother Maher al-Asad, commander of key army units, and his cousin Hafiz Makhlouf, a security chief, on the other. But these are only rumours. So far no overt split has emerged and President Bashar still seems to be in command.
* And yet clearly the Syrian regime has not handled the crisis in a proper manner.
There is no doubt, however, that the regime has badly mishandled the crisis. The children who drew graffiti on a wall in Daraa last March should not have been arrested and beaten – the incident which sparked the uprising. The use of live fire against protesters, the killings, the mass arrests and torture which have followed have all gravely damaged the regime’s image and undercut its legitimacy.
* Why do you think the uprising is not yet life-threatening for Bashar al-Asad?
The uprising is not yet life-threatening for the regime, and this for three main reasons: A foreign intervention (on the Libyan model) is highly unlikely, if not totally impossible. No Western country has the stomach for an adventure of this sort – and certainly not the U.S. nor any European country. Second, Syria’s neighbours – and the international community as a whole – are worried about the possible regional repercussions of a Syrian collapse. They want stability, not chaos. Among the questions being asked are the following: Would the fall of the Syrian regime re-ignite the Lebanese civil war? Would it threaten the calm on Israel’s border? Would it affect the delicate confessional balance in Iraq at a time when the U.S. is preparing to withdraw its remaining troops? How would Iran, Syria’s main regional ally, react? And – last but not least – what would be the impact of a Syrian collapse on Turkey’s Arab policy? Syria is a key element in Turkey’s regional policy. These worries by the international community are assets for President Bashar, and will help keep him in power, at least for the time being. And third, President Bashar has allies at home. It is by no means certain that the protest movement has the support of a majority in the country.
* What is the line up in the country, for and against the regime?
For the regime: The main commanders of the army and security forces; the Alawi community, to which the President belongs; the Christian community (about 10% of the population), fearful of what might happen to it if an Islamic regime were to come to power; the middle and upper classes in the two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo; the Sunni merchants in these cities have been traditional allies of the Asad regime. Also a ‘new bourgeosie’ which has prospered over the last decade by the liberalisation of the economy and which has benefited from the inflow of foreign investment, the introduction of private banks and insurance companies; the launch of a stock exchange; the opening of many new hotels and restaurants to cope with the surge in tourism; the rehabilitation of the old cities in Damascus and Aleppo as well as archaeological sites and other tourist attractions, etc. And then the relatively non-political ‘silent majority’ that prefers security and stability to political freedoms, and does not want Syria to suffer the dreadful fate of Iraq, shattered by the American invasion and occupation, or Lebanon, shattered by a 15 year civil war.
Against the regime: The rural poor, devastated by four or five years of drought, which has forced hundreds of thousands of farmers off their land to shanty towns around the main cities. Unemployed youth. The whole Arab world has suffered from a population explosion. Schools and universities are over-populated and over-stretched. They turn out tens of thousands of semi-educated youth for whom there are no jobs. This has been the motor of the revolution in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen -- and also in Syria.
Small businessmen who have been unable to make money because of the corruption of big businessmen close to the regime. Intellectuals frustrated by the lack of freedom of expression or of association, and the absence of a free press. A slice of the population outraged by corruption and police brutality.
An Islamist opposition – some of it affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood – that wants revenge for the Hama massacres of 1982, and has a fervently-held ambition to overthrow what it considers a godless Alawi regime.
Last but not least, groups of exiled dissidents in London, Paris, Brussels, New York, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf... These exiles have raised money for their cause of toppling the Asad regime and have also had some financial support from the US over the past decade. They seem to have been able to supply the protesters with satellite telephones, with financial and media support, with propaganda – and perhaps even with arms.
There certainly seems to be an armed element in the street opposition, which has managed to kill several dozen soldiers and policemen. It is easy to smuggle arms into Syria across its porous borders with Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.
* What about the Kurds ?
The Kurds have been relatively quiet. Early in the crisis, President Bashar issued a decree giving citizenship (at last) to a great many stateless Kurds. This seems to have satisfied one at least of their demands – and a major one.
* President Bashar has called for a National Dialogue.
Yes, this is the important new element in a confused situation: President Bashar’s call for a National Dialogue. This has already had some consequences. Some 200 opposition members (if not the most virulent ones) have held a meeting in Damascus, which might be followed by others. The opposition has still not produced a credible leader or group of leaders. It seems to be split between those who want to work with the regime to produce a new and more liberal Syria and those who simply want to get rid of the regime altogether. If the former group emerge on top, this could result in a real dialogue between regime and opposition.
Meanwhile, the army has been withdrawn from some cities, such as Hama. The regime seems to be attempting to create the right atmosphere for a dialogue by allowing some freedom for peaceful demonstrations. It looks as if President Bashar wants to implement some reforms – some restrictions on the use of force by his security services, some freedom for the press, some reforms of the prison service, some curbing of corruption, some release of political prisoners – so long as these do not threaten his hold on power.
