As the dynamics in the Middle East are shifting, Professor Hamit Bozarslan emphasized the necessity for Kurds to achieve internal integration and underlined that the Kurdish question is not confined to a single country but is a regional matter that must be understood as such.
In Turkey, discussions about resolving the Kurdish question have resurfaced after the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, shook hands with Democracy Party (DEM) deputies and subsequently made a call regarding Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned under harsh conditions for 26 years. At a time when the balance of power in the Middle East is shifting, what is the significance of Bahçeli’s statement? Does the Turkish state genuinely seek to resolve the Kurdish issue, an issue it avoids even naming? And what does it mean for Bahçeli to address Öcalan directly? What lies ahead for the Kurds as regional dynamics shift once again?
To answer these questions, we spoke with Hamit Bozarslan, a Middle East expert and professor at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris.
The first part of this interview can be read here
Lack of transparency
Highlighting the lack of transparency in the discussions about the resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey, Prof. Bozarslan noted: "Bahçeli’s statement has been widely debated in Turkey, including within Kurdish circles. Analyzing these developments is very challenging because the greatest obstacle is the lack of transparency. Who is involved in this process? Which actors are part of it? Does the MHP represent itself, or is it representing other forces? What are the tensions within the AKP regarding the Kurdish issue? We do not know the answers to these questions."
Solving the Kurdish question is not the real goal
Bozarslan suggested that developments in the Middle East might have pushed Bahçeli to make such a statement, adding: "When Bahçeli made this call, the war in Lebanon was ongoing. The Assad regime had not yet fallen. There was a concern that Israel might intervene in the Kurdish issue, which could weaken Turkey. Instead of allowing Israel to handle this, Turkey thought it should take control. This idea was expressed in the 1990s and 2000s as well. The essence of this approach and these statements is not to acknowledge the Kurdish question but to frame it as a Turkish issue. The primary aim here is to temporarily defuse existing tensions."
He continued: "What we are seeing today is a continuation of this approach. Will this stance persist after Assad’s removal? We do not know. In any case, the U.S. and Europe would support negotiations between Kurds and Turkey, and there is a similar expectation among Kurds. However, there is no real opposition within Turkey."
Denial of the Kurdish people’s legitimacy
Bozarslan stressed that Bahçeli’s statements and the overall stance about resolving the Kurdish question fall far short of acknowledging the existence of the Kurdish issue or the legitimacy of the Kurdish people. He said: "From my perspective, the main problem is not whether Öcalan participates in parliament but whether the Kurdish question and the legitimacy of the Kurdish people are recognized. If this does not happen, it will inevitably lead to new problems in the future. These calls absolutely do not mean recognition of the Kurdish question. Recognizing the Kurdish question and the legitimacy of the Kurdish people is not limited to Turkey. It must be acknowledged as a regional issue in the Middle East. Moreover, neither the Syrian Kurds nor the Turkish Kurds are seeking independence. If the intentions are serious, the status of Rojava can be recognized."
The push for Kurdish submission to Sunni Turkish dominance
Bozarslan highlighted the Turkish state's ongoing insistence that the Kurdish people submit to the dominance of Sunni Turkish identity, and said: “The current stance is essentially this: ‘Okay, you exist, we can accept your presence, and perhaps injustices have been done to you. But now you have representation in parliament, you have a leader, and we acknowledge all of this. In return, you must accept the authority of Turkey or Turkishness.’
This was precisely what happened in 2014 and 2015. Looking at the rhetoric of Erdoğan and the AKP at that time, the attitude of the regime was clear: ‘Yes, we recognize Kurdish existence. We are ready for a peace process. We even denounce past oppressions, such as the burning of villages, and admit you are right about those matters. But now, you must align yourselves with Sunni Turkish authorities.’”
Rojava targeted for refusing submission
According to Bozarslan, the peace process collapsed because Syrian Kurds rejected this imposition, resulting in Turkey adopting a hostile policy against Rojava: "The fundamental question is whether Kurds will be accepted as Kurds or merely as a subordinate force under Turkish control. This is my interpretation of the recent debates. As I mentioned, given the lack of transparency and absence of concrete information, I cannot go beyond these assessments."
Recognizing Abdullah Öcalan’s influence
Bozarslan sees the recent call by Devlet Bahçeli directed at Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan as an acknowledgment of Öcalan’s influence: "Bahçeli’s statements demonstrate a recognition of Öcalan’s symbolic power. Demanding that the PKK lay down its arms is meaningless, as their armed struggle in Turkey is now at its lowest level in decades. However, the PKK remains a symbolic force and a central reference point for the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Similarly, Öcalan is widely regarded as a symbol among Kurds."
The Kurdish Question: a regional challenge
Bozarslan said that the Kurdish question is not limited to Turkey but is a regional matter: "The Kurdish presence in parliament and the repeated electoral victories in municipalities, even under the constant threat of government-appointed trustees, demonstrate that the Kurds have not been defeated. The Kurdish community is highly conscious, and their resistance has shifted to different platforms. The Kurdish question predates the PKK and continues to this day. It is not just a Turkish issue but a regional one. This broader perspective, however, is absent from the discussions of Bahçeli and the AKP."
The urgency of Kurdish unity
Bozarslan underlined the critical need for Kurdish unity in a time of shifting dynamics in the Middle East, and said: "The main question is not what awaits the Kurds, but what the Kurds need to do. The role of the U.S., especially in Syria, will be decisive, but Kurds cannot rely solely on external actors. Kurdish movements and actors need to critically assess their own actions. The most urgent priority is fostering internal integration among Kurds.
The existence of Iraqi Kurdistan is itself a miracle, especially given the atrocities of the 1980s, such as the Anfal operations and village burnings. However, today’s Kurdistan is divided into two camps: one fearful of Iran and the other overly cautious of Turkey. Integration between these factions is vital. Similarly, relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava must improve. While achieving seamless cooperation may be difficult, steps can be taken to enhance ties, such as opening borders, mutual recognition, and joint diplomacy. The future of the Kurdish struggle hinges on addressing these challenges."
Iran’s collapsing militia strategy
Bozarslan also commented on Iran’s faltering regional influence, which has implications for Kurds, and said: "Iran’s strategy of maintaining regional dominance through its militias has completely collapsed in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. This decline represents a significant loss of legitimacy for the Iranian regime. While a complete revolution or regime collapse in Iran may not be imminent, new uprisings are likely.
In such scenarios, Iranian Kurdistan will inevitably play a major role. We saw this in 2022, when the slogan ‘Jin Jiyan Azadî’ (Women, Life, Freedom) from Kurdistan became a rallying cry across Iran. Kurdistan also became a reference point for Baluchistan. From this moment forward, Kurds must prepare for various scenarios and contingencies."