The fate of the civil war in Syria remarkably changed in July, 2012.

The incidents that erupted in March 2011 and the increasingly growing civil war gained acceleration in Aleppo in July 2012 when, as it can be remembered, Aleppo was about to be seized from the regime. Outside the regime, almost all the organizations that armed themselves were taking part in this war in the Syrian territory.

During those times, Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups were in a more passive position. Dozens of groups that gathered under the name of Free Syrian Army were fighting against the regime. They were Syrian combatants fighting for the Syrian people. They had a relation with some states like Turkey, but this relation was a kind of necessity developed for their own benefits, not for fighting for the political benefits of Turkey or any other state.

During that period, a corridor on the line of Jarablus-Minbic was opened for the opposition fighting in Aleppo. If Aleppo fell, the regime would face difficulties, the rapist organization Nusra would gain no initiative, and the Syrian opposition would remain under the control of Syrians.

AKP found this situation risky for itself, thinking that the secular and democratic opposition might make no terms with it in the event of winning. It thus closed the arm corridor of the opposition advancing in Aleppo, which forced Nusra and Ikhwan groups to retreat. The Assad regime crushed the FSA groups in a sandwich operation in Aleppo and the remaining couldn't gather strength again. The 'armed opposition' in Syria went under the control of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups and ISIS started to gain strength.

The AKP government therewith took action in order to have a voice in Syria over these groups, and to hinder the establishment of a Kurdish status. It wanted to broaden its movement area by taking the border gates of Serêkaniyê, Tal Abyad and Jarablus. Serêkaniyê didn't succeed, and Tal Abyad was conceded to ISIS.

It is mainly the Tal Abyad border gate that was, and is still being, used for the attacks on Rojava and the relation traffic here, and the Jarablus border gate for the relation traffic in Aleppo region.

Now that Tal Abyad has fallen, Jarablus is the only border gate left for the AKP to bring into connection with ISIS.

Jarablus is 100 km north east of Aleppo, 40 km west of Kobanê, and right at the bank of the River Euphrates (Fırat) which currently serves as the border between Kobanê and Jarablus.

In the course of the French domination, Jarablus was a district of Aleppo, and Kobanê a town of Jarablus. It was, however, cleared of Kurds later. It has a population of around 100 thousand. On 15 July 2012, the regime left the city which thereafter went under the control of FSA groups. When FSA was broken down in Aleppo, control of Jarablus was taken by the AKP-backed Al Nusra. Over 10 thousand Kurdish inhabitants here were forced to migrate. On 15 December 2014, Jarablus was conceded to ISIS which therewith started aiming everyone not abiding them. The Arab tribe of Cedawra in particular suffered savage massacres for refusing to surrender. The neighboring AKP heard no single words from it...

By blowing up the bridge between Kobanê and Jarablus on 5 March 2015, ISIS wanted to hinder a probable operation.

The AKP government cannot come to terms with the imminent fall of Jarablus after Tal Abyad. This is why it is making preparations for a military intervention. By taking the Jarablus region under its control, its plan and consideration is to maintain its relation with ISIS, and to keep the delivery of fighters and arms going. This is because of the fact that the savage organization of ISIS will have no single door opened to the rest of the world and enter a process of suffocation in Syria in the event that Jarablus is taken from it. Likewise, the same ISIS will no longer be able to act as it wishes in Iraq.

The plan AKP calls 'buffer zone for security' is indeed a plan to protect ISIS and to avoid it suffering further blows. The aim is to sustain the AKP-ISIS traffic in the region, which is led over Tal Abyad, because there is no other ground to do this!

By supporting the ISIS here, the Turkish state aims to lead them to Aleppo, to back and provide a basis for the ISIS attacks in Aleppo region, to take the Syria under control substantially, and to consolidate its own political and commercial hegemony.

One other plan in this regard is to prevent the Jarablus region, which neighbors Turkey, from being taken under control by Kurds and Democratic Syrian opposition. This at the same time means the continuation of the war in Syria and deepening of the chaos currently present.

In conclusion, it is impossible for Turkey to send troops to Jarablus or any other region of Syria under the current circumstances. This has no political, military, economic and diplomatic ground. Such an operation will carry the war into Turkey, efficaciously remove the 'Turkey-Syria' border drawn between Rojava (West) and Bakur (North) Kurdistan which will become obsolete for the Kurdish people.

Rather than sending troops, Turkey will want to 'secure' this area, to have it controlled by the groups affiliated to itself, and to hinder the union of the cantons of Kobanê and Efrîn. It will therefore direct the groups of fighters, which are made up of by youths from Jarablus and Minbic and provided training in the Turkish territory like Konya, to this region within a soonest time.

Yet, the clearance of the Sırrin region to the south of Kobanê from ISIS, the aerial support by coalition forces and the land operations of YPG/YPJ forces will enable the liberation of Jarablus from ISIS and bring a breath of fresh air in the Syrian territory this summer.

*This piece by journalist Amed Dicle was translated from Turkish by ANF English service.