NATO’s Gladio stood with the Turkish state - III

The conflict was essentially between the PKK and the NATO, not just the Turkish state.

Massacres, forced displacements, and acts of cultural destruction were carried out throughout the country with the full support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The International Plot was also executed through NATO’s power, led by the United States.

The August 15 Initiative carried not only historical significance but also a strong political message. In the face of this offensive, Turkey’s defense mechanisms proved insufficient. As a result, NATO stepped in, with the first move being carried out by Germany, which designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a ‘terrorist’ organization. In his Fifth Defense, Abdullah Öcalan analyzes the roles played by NATO against the Kurdish people and the PKK, the attacks it helped organize, and the obstacles it posed during negotiation processes. He outlines these as part of what he calls the four phases of Gladio warfare.

Possibly the first action of NATO’s Gladio

Abdullah Öcalan, who shaped the decision to form a party as a response to the martyrdom of Haki Karer, offered the following analysis regarding what may have been the first operation of Gladio: “The provocation and assassination of Haki Karer by Alaattin Kapan on May 18, 1977—luring him into a trap—may well have been the first action carried out by the Turkish and NATO Gladio against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, even while we were still in the group phase. Had the Party Program not been published, had there been no response to the declaration of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and had Alaattin Kapan not been punished with death, it is likely that the group— if not entirely, would likely have faced serious liquidation. Maraş Massacre in late 1978 can also be considered the second major operation by Gladio against the rapidly growing group.”

To prevent the August 15 Initiative

Abdullah Öcalan stated that the second phase of Gladio’s attacks began with the military coup of 1980 and lasted until 1985. He explained: “The purpose of the coup was to silence and eliminate all opposition movements within the country, especially leftist forces. The infiltration of operatives into the PKK and the plans orchestrated by those powers ultimately failed due to the leadership’s methods and approach.

Representatives of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were not in favor of the guerrilla forces launching any major initiatives. In fact, during the stage when guerrillas crossed the border and attempted to enter the country, many were martyred. In 1985, during a meeting in Damascus, Mesud Barzani explained that his request to abandon the August 15 Initiative stemmed not solely from Turkish pressure but was instead aligned with NATO Gladio’s broader agenda. This was a concern he voiced clearly.”

JITEM and Hizbullah

Abdullah Öcalan described a period in which Gladio entered a more active phase. Regarding this third stage of warfare, he stated: “The third and most significant phase of the Gladio wars spans from 1985 to the assassination of Turgut Ozal in 1993. When it became clear that we would not abandon the August 15 Initiative despite the message conveyed through Mesud Barzani, the formations of JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization) and Hizbullah were activated in 1986. This model of genocide was updated through the operational practices of JITEM and Hizbullah, with both organizations granted equivalent powers and responsibilities within a shared framework. Over ten thousand unsolved murders were carried out under the extra-constitutional authority granted to these two fraternal organizations. Key incidents at the start of this period—such as the elimination of Ozan Sefkan and his group, and the assassination of comrade Mahsum Korkmaz—were either directly or indirectly linked to JITEM. If tactical leadership had properly analyzed the period between 1990 and 1993 and had succeeded in expanding the guerrilla both in quantity and quality, while putting strategic plans into action, the course of history might have been very different. A historic resolution could have been achieved in the early months of 1993.”

Turgut Ozal was eliminated

Abdullah Öcalan also offered reflections on the death of Turgut Ozal, continuing as follows: “Turgut Ozal recognized the reality of the situation and favored reconciliation. He was convinced that, rather than losing Kurdistan entirely, it was far more important—and a lasting, brotherly path for peoples to live together—to keep it within a shared state structure through federal ties. Both internal and external branches of Gladio saw this approach as a threat to their own existence and thus viewed eliminating Turgut Ozal as the only way out. The United States and Israel, which had their own plans regarding Iraq, considered the positions of Turgut Ozal and Eşref Bitlis extremely dangerous to their interests. As a result, they supported the political shift that brought Suleyman Demirel and Tansu Ciller (along with Erdal Inonu) to power through what amounted to a coup.”

No rules of war were respected

Describing the fourth phase of the Gladio wars, covering the years 1993 to 1998, Ocalan emphasized that while those within the state who supported peace and a political solution were being purged, efforts to eliminate the Kurdish people and the PKK continued with brutal intensity. He stated: “Nearly four thousand villages were burned and destroyed; millions of villagers were forcibly displaced. Thousands of villagers were killed by village guards, Hizbullah, and JITEM. Women were subjected to rape. Children were stripped of their identities in boarding schools through assimilationist humiliation and rampant sexual violence. The number of village guards was increased to one hundred thousand. Anyone not cooperating with the state was declared an enemy. The most extensive military operations in the history of the Turkish Republic were launched against the PKK. The KDP, village guards, and confessors were used relentlessly and placed at the forefront of these operations. No rules of warfare were respected. Even the bodies of guerrilla fighters were mutilated. The war was no longer being conducted by regular internal security forces but by interconnected Gladio–JITEM–Hizbullah networks.

 One example of this period’s intensity was the assassination attempt against me on May 6, 1996, when a one-thousand-kilogram bomb was detonated as part of a plot.”

Gladio reactivated to block a political solution

Abdullah Öcalan explained that Gladio re-emerged in 1997 to obstruct the path toward a political resolution. He stated: "Just like in the early 1990s, by the late 1990s there was once again a strong possibility for strategic success. The dialogue initiatives launched by Turgut Ozal continued in 1997 through a channel involving then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and a wing of the military. Once again, the prospect of peace and a political solution came very close. But I believe that, once more, Gladio intervened—along with the internal and external forces backing it— and prevented these dialogue efforts from achieving their intended outcomes. They did not allow the opportunity for peace and political resolution to be realized (...) In September 1998, the Turkish state's threat of war against Syria aimed to dismantle my strategic position in the Middle East. My presence in the region, and the strategic role I held there, played a central part in this. However, I believe the real reason was the serious re-emergence of the prospect of peace and political resolution. Militarily, Turkey could have targeted Syria much earlier, so the choice of this particular moment is clearly linked to the renewed possibility of dialogue.

In short, the decision made at the 1920 Cairo Conference remains in effect. keeping the Kurdish question unresolved continues to be of vital importance for the control of both Turkey and the Middle East. It is more illuminating to evaluate the approach of many domestic and international powers toward the PKK—and thus toward the Kurdish people—within this framework. For me, 1998 was truly meant to be a turning point. As I have often emphasized in my analyses, the guerrilla war, which was trapped in a vicious cycle dominated by the Gladio–JITEM–Hizbullah triad, could not have advanced to a higher phase without breaking free from this grip. If peace and a political resolution could not be achieved, there would be no other path but to escalate the revolutionary people's war to a new level.”

To be continued...