The meeting of six people, led by Abdullah Ocalan and held at the Cubuk Dam in Ankara, marked the beginning of a painful and difficult process. In an atmosphere of extreme oppression and despotism targeting both the Kurdish people and revolutionary movements, saying 'Kurdistan is a colony' was a step that demanded both courage and determination. As Ocalan described it, the challenge did not stem from sheer force but from the distinct nature of White Turkish fascism and the suffocating psychological and cultural environment it created.

Abdullah Ocalan stated that reviving the Kurdish national movement in a context where the Turkish state was celebrating the victory of cultural genocide was akin to bringing the dead back to life. Sensing the approaching footsteps of the September 12 military coup, he concluded that Turkey and Northern Kurdistan were not suitable grounds for launching a powerful resistance at that time, and that it was necessary to leave the country for a while. Since Europe did not provide fertile ground for revolutionary breakthroughs, he emphasized that the Middle Eastern sphere was more consistent with their goals. For this reason, unlike others, Ocalan did not choose Europe as the strategic center of his work.

War cannot be avoided

Abdullah Ocalan noted that the conditions of the time required the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to pursue a revolutionary war internally, and to form alliances with other organizations and real socialist states externally. Reflecting on the struggle for a free identity, he stated: ‘‘The PKK held great promise for a life of freedom, but ideological promises alone could never be enough to achieve it. It was necessary to create and activate a PKK that could wage war. Without the willingness to fight, no form of freedom could be achieved—not even the recognition of our very identity. What was imagined in Ankara was far from a free life; perhaps it was merely the gaining of a name for one’s own identity. Even that carried tremendous risks. In the end, despite those risks, Kurdish identity had been gained—at least as a name. But the second great step could not be a mere repetition. A war for the freedom of that identity had to begin.

If you want freedom, you must first claim existence. And if you want existence, you must succeed in being free. Without acknowledging the realities of physical force, without taking action or engaging in struggle against it, neither existence, nor identity, nor freedom can be achieved. The active stance of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party at its inception received powerful support from the people. Although it contained ambiguities, the initial strategy of anti-colonial national liberation carried important truths, which is why it was embraced. Even certain limited actions carried out within that strategic framework were met with extraordinary interest and support. Once the movement entered the Middle Eastern arena, these kinds of discussions around existence and freedom began to intensify.’’

The inevitable war against colonialism

Abdullah Ocalan stated that they never doubted the necessity of a Revolutionary People's War, emphasizing that it was only through the methods of armed resistance that they could defend themselves against all forms of oppressive ideologies such as 'one homeland,' 'one language,' 'one culture,' and 'one flag.' He made the following striking remarks: “Revolutionary people's wars of the time had been thoroughly studied. For Kurdistan, adopting this model of national liberation war was inevitable. From the group phase to the preparations in the Middle East, this model of warfare shaped the entire process. In all training meetings, conferences, and congress documents, the Revolutionary People's War was among the primary topics studied, debated, and decided upon.

The practices of the September 12 military coup, the horrific torture inflicted on prisoners—particularly in Diyarbakir Prison—and the transformation of all social spaces into virtual concentration camps demanded the immediate launch of a new strategic initiative. Executions were underway. Hunger strikes had begun. Whatever was to be done, the time was now. History would not forgive delay. In fact, actions of self-defense had never ceased. The August 15 Initiative was launched too late, in a style that lacked both skill and alignment with our preparations. More than the action itself, what mattered was its historical and contemporary significance.

Between 1987 and October 9, 1998, when I left Syria, I personally prepared and launched a series of powerful and relentless offensives aimed at rendering ineffective the opportunism imposed upon us, along with JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter- Terrorism) and the counter-guerrilla forces that skillfully exploited it. By the end of 1998, our historic Revolutionary People's War initiative had not been dismantled—but we were still far from achieving the victory we had hoped for.”

From internal collapse to ideological transformation

Abdullah Ocalan sought to achieve victory between 1987 and 1998, yet the desired outcome did not materialize. Purging tendencies, betrayals, and the intervention of counter-guerrilla forces within the PKK obstructed this goal. The organization experienced serious ideological deviations and extensive internal damage. The mass desertions that occurred between 2002 and 2004, involving more than a thousand individuals, were largely shaped by a right-wing deviation that had been present from the very beginning. One of the most devastating episodes was caused by the so-called 'Gang of Four' — Zeki, Terzi Cemal, Kör Cemal, and Hogir — who, under the guise of 'identifying agents,' were responsible for the massacre of hundreds of guerrilla fighters.  Instead of advancing the people’s war, many top figures turned into agents of the counter-guerrilla, acted as saboteurs and internal liquidators within the movement.

Meanwhile, guerrilla forces had lost their tactical effectiveness, launching attacks on military outposts with blind courage and suffering heavy casualties. They failed to develop a well-organized people’s war and were unable to respond adequately to enemy offensives. According to Ocalan, the signs indicated that if self-obsession, deviation, and betrayal had not emerged, a meaningful resolution could have been achieved—even if full national independence was not. However, the opposite occurred.

As all revolutionary burdens were increasingly placed on Ocalan alone, the International Plot was put into motion in 1998.

Despite such deep crises within the PKK, the Kurdish Freedom Struggle was carried forward. While the anticipated revolution was not fully realized, revolutions within the revolution did take place. These included the revolution of rebirth, the emergence of a people fighting for their freedom, the militant identity shaped through struggle, and above all, the women’s freedom revolution. These transformative developments brought significant changes in both social practice and collective consciousness. In doing so, they laid the groundwork for the emergence of the Democratic Nation paradigm.

If there is no democratic politics

In his Fifth Defense, Ocalan stated that if a solution based on democratic politics did not emerge, the strategy of Revolutionary People's War would inevitably have to be tested as the primary means of achieving identity and freedom. While expressing his belief that a resolution could still be reached through democratic politics, he emphasized: “The only necessary condition is that the governments of Turkey, Syria, and Iran—or more precisely, the decisive forces within these ruling powers—must demonstrate a political will for a solution. Otherwise, what will come to the fore is the Revolutionary People's Struggle, old yet still relevant, and in its most developed form, the Revolutionary People's War.”

Alongside these important assessments, Ocalan also drew attention to the inevitable failure of genocidal mindsets and policies. He stated: “It is inconceivable that the Revolutionary People's War, which has proven its effectiveness in the past even through ordinary tactics, would now fail after so much accumulated experience. Even if genocidal policies are applied, the outcome will not change. After such widespread exposure and isolation, it is no longer sustainable to continue the current methods of cultural genocide. There will, of course, be forces that insist on these methods—but even if that happens, the outcome will inevitably turn even more decisively against them. The real issue here is to properly and adequately fulfill the requirements of the people's war, which in the past was not carried out successfully.”

To be continued...